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ABSTRACT 
STUDIES IN INDIAN INFORMAL SECTOR 
by 
Arpita Banerjee-Chakraborty 
University of New Hampshire, December, 2010 
This dissertation contributes to the literature in two ways. It explores the 
link between the trade liberalization policies and the informal sector wages, and 
examines the economy of the self-employed sector of India. Specifically, this 
dissertation (i) develops a general equilibrium model incorporating the self-
employed sector as a separate informal sector and demonstrates the connection 
between the trade liberalization policies and the informal sector wages; (ii) 
presents a system analysis for the economy of the self-employed sector; (iii) 
highlights the distinctive characteristics of the self-employed sector and 
generates a better understanding of the difference between the self-employed 
and the wage-working sectors. 
There are a number of studies focusing on the impact of the changing 
policy environment in the developing countries on the informal sector. While most 
of them are in agreement that the size of the informal sector has grown post-
trade reforms in the developing countries, there is still no consensus about the 
impact of the reforms on the terms of informal work, particularly the wages, the 
xii 
theoretical model developed in this dissertation shows that the current 
understanding changes significantly when the self-employed sector is 
incorporated into the analysis. The extent of self-employment plays a crucial role 
in determining the link between the trade liberalization policies and the informal 
sector wages. This model emphasizes that the growing self-employment and 
informalization of the formal sector workers in India can result in non-increasing 
informal sector wages. 
The analysis of the economic system of the self-employed sector 
generates important insights about the production relationships prevailing in this 
sector. A microcosm of self-employed occupations of India is developed and the 
occupations are categorized according to location, gender and types of products. 
The system of production is analyzed to find out the difference of this sector with 
other wage-working sectors. The extra-legal and extra-capitalist nature of 
production highlights the inadequacy of the abstract modeling in capturing the 
economic characteristics of this sector. The Kinship Associations build the 
informal institutions and determine the terms of input valuations. This dissertation 
also demonstrates the importance of maintaining the community ties in helping 
the productive capacity of the self-employed sector. 
XII 
INTRODUCTION 
The informal sector is the largest livelihood generating sector in a number 
of developing countries and it is crucial for development economists to explain 
how the economy of this sector works. The adoption of trade liberalization 
policies by a number of developing countries has made it challenging for the 
economists to analyze the responses of the informal sector to the said policies. 
Again, a growing number of poor people now work as self-employed. Although 
there are a number of studies that attempt to explain the working conditions and 
well-being of the subcontracted informal sector, there is a serious lack of 
research on the self-employed sector. This dissertation fills that gap by 
incorporating the self-employed sector as a sector separate from the 
subcontracted informal sector and shedding some light on the economy of the 
self-employed sector. 
Chapter 1 presents a review of the existing literature on informal sector. 
This chapter discusses the extent of ambiguity and divergence present in the 
literature that emerges from the variety of definitions, meanings and 
categorizations of informal sector. A historical account of coining the term 
Informal is provided in this chapter. On one hand, informal sector is perceived as 
a sector consisting of marginal economic activities that meet survival needs of 
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the poor population and.are unrelated to the formal sector (ILO 1972, Hart 1973, 
Sethuraman 1976, Tokman 1978, Breman 1996). Such a perception of informal 
sector understands the slow economic growth rate as a reason behind the 
growth of this sector. On the other hand, some researchers (such as Birkbeck 
1978, Moser 1978, Beneria 1989, Capecchi 1989, Castells and Portes 1989) 
understand the informal sector as a sector subjugated to the formal sector, which 
help the latter reduce its cost of production. According to this view, there are 
different modes of production in an economy that coexist interdependently, and 
that the very nature of the capitalist development, or rather the lack of it leads to 
the growth and permanence of the informal sector. Again, researchers like 
Hernando De Soto (1989) emphasize a legal framework that originates and helps 
grow the informal sector. This view tells us that the state regulations lead an 
entrepreneur to choose to become informal in order to avoid such legal bindings. 
Expectedly, such legalist understanding of the informal sector favors elimination 
of, or at the least reduction of state regulations. 
Chapter 1 shows that the debate over the origin and definition of informal 
sector does not answer the common query about the genesis of this sector, that 
is, why did this sector come into picture. Instead of finding answer to this 
question, this chapter reflects upon the justification of this question and takes a 
different standpoint. The position is that, the informal sector was always already 
there, and it is the formal sector whose origin needs to be questioned. A future 
research project will explore this standpoint. 
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A thorough examination of the literature on Indian trade 
liberalization experience and on Indian informal sector follows. It is noted in this 
chapter, that no previous study has considered the self-employed sector as a 
separate and important informal sector. All of the studies that focus upon the 
response of the informal sector to the changing macroeconomic policies assume 
that the informal sector is a subordinate sector to the formal sector; it mirrors the 
formal sector in terms of production processes and exists only to produce 
intermediate goods for the formal sector. A study of the impact of the changing 
macroeconomic policies on the well-being of the informal sector workers was 
much needed, where the self-employed sector would be considered as an 
informal sector different from the subcontracted informal sector. This dissertation 
takes up this challenge to propose such an economic exercise. 
Moreover, chapter 1 reviews the literature on the self-employed sector, 
most of which are done by sociologists and anthropologists. This dissertation is 
the first ever economic study of the self-employed sector. It builds upon the 
concept of reciprocal services propagated by Sahlins (1972), Gaughan and 
Ferman(1987). 
This dissertation differentiates between subcontracted and self-employed 
informal sector and gives both their due importance by considering them as two 
separate sectors. Specifically, this dissertation contributes to the existing 
understanding of the informal sector in the following ways. 
(i) It sheds new light on the response of the informal sector wages to the trade 
liberalization policies. 
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(ii) It examines the general characteristics of the self-employed sector to help 
better understand this sector. 
(iii) It traces out the role the Kinship Association plays in determining the 
production relationships within the self-employed sector and thereby 
emphasizes the importance of policies that maintain or at the least do not 
perturb the community ties the self-employed people belong to. 
Chapter 2 formulates a four-sector general equilibrium model, to examine 
the impact of trade liberalization policies on the wages of the informal sector, the 
model is built upon the existing theory of a small open economy, and uses a 
falling tariff rate as an indicator of trade liberalization (as happened in many 
developing countries including India). The model includes a formal import-
competing manufacturing sector employing formal labor, capital and an 
intermediate commodity produced by informal sector, a non-traded 
subcontracted informal sector producing intermediate goods for the formal sector 
using informal labor and capital, a non-traded self-employed informal sector 
producing petty goods and services using informal labor and social capital and 
an agricultural export sector using informal labor and land. The two major 
improvements that this modeling exercise brings over the previous studies are 
that there is capital mobility between the formal and subcontracted informal 
sector (unlike, for example, the assumption of Marjit 2003), and that there are 
two informal sectors instead of only one intermediate goods-producing informal 
sector (unlike, for example, Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003 and Marjit 2003). The 
comparative static analysis brings out some very intriguing results, which 
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depends upon the fraction of labor employed and labor's share in the self-
employed sector. 
Chapter 3 examines the characteristics of the economy of the self-employed 
sector. The goal of this chapter was to find out the general economic pattern that 
prevails across various self-employed occupations seen in India. The relations of 
production are analyzed and the features of the costs of production are studied in 
this chapter, in order to find out the determinants of the said relationships. It is 
demonstrated that the logic of abstract modeling falls short in explaining the 
production relations existing in this sector, and instead the major determinant of 
such relations is identified. This chapter shows that the law of marginal 
productivity often fails to reflect the determination of input values in the self-
employed sector. By recognizing the role of Kinship Associations in the 
determination of input values, this chapter emphasizes the role of policies aimed 
at protecting and/or not harming the community ties, which help the self-
employed population avail the inputs of production. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as the following. Chapter 1 
presents a detailed study of the existing literature on the definition and origin of 
informal sector. It also reviews the literature on the Indian experience of trade 
liberalization, and the studies on the impact the liberalization policies had on the 
informal sector in the developing countries including India. The gaps in the 
existing literature are identified, which are attempted to fill in the next two 
chapters. Chapter 2 formulates a theoretical model, and solves it to trace out the 
role of the self-employed sector in affecting how the trade liberalization policies 
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determine the wages of the informal sector. Chapter 3 examines the economic 
characteristics of the self-employed sector of India and shows the determinants 
of the production relations that exist in this sector. This chapter also argues in 
favor of the noneconomic determination of such relationships. Chapter 4 provides 




A LITERATURE REVIEW ON INFORMAL ECONOMY 
1.1 Introduction 
The informal sector has long been a significant feature of both 
industrialized and less developed economies. Yet, this is an ambiguous and 
broad category that allows various definitions and analyses of its meaning. The 
ambiguity becomes overwhelming when the political and ideological debate 
surrounding the concept and scope of the informal sector is concerned. A study 
of the informal sector requires a clear understanding and description of the 
definitions and dynamics of the informal sector. This chapter contributes to the 
understanding of one of the fundamental structural features of contemporary 
world economies, namely, the informal sector. 
Numerous researches on the impact of trade reform on various sectors of 
an economy have been conducted. In particular, the impact on the informal 
sector has been studied to be positive (Currie and Harrison, 1997; Goldberg and 
Pavcnik, 2003; Sinha and Harris-White, 2007). A majority of the studies have 
concentrated on the size and growth of the informal sector. The impact on the 
income of the people working in the informal sector has rarely been a point of 
study, particularly in case of Indian informal sector (except Marjit, 2003; Marjit 
and Maiti, 2006). 
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Researches that have explored the impact of trade reform on informal 
sector, have always neglected the self-employed informal segment. In all those 
studies including that of Marjit (2003), informal sector is either just a mirror of its 
formal counterpart (Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003) or is solely the producer of 
intermediate good for the formal sector (Marjit 2003). Studies that do consider 
some type of petty consumer goods sector (similar to the self-employed sector) 
ignore the crucial fact that such a sector produces on a very meager amount of 
capital (Marjit and Maiti, 2006), and it uses social capital, for example, the 
community, family and/or village network too. There are a number of sociological 
studies of the self-employed sector, but without much insight about the general 
pattern of the economy of this sector. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 1.2-
1.4 includes discussion on the origin, categorization and definition of the sector, 
its historical importance and ideological and political biases present in various 
analyses. Section 1.5 discusses the history and importance of trade reforms and 
the Indian experience of trade liberalization. It also includes the existing 
understanding about Indian informal sector, responses of Indian informal sector 
to the trade reform policies and what we know about the wage impact of Trade 
reform. A discussion of the literatures on self-employed sector follows in section 
1.6. Section 1.7 highlights the concept of economic dualism proposed by Arthur 
Lewis in 1954, its relevance today and its major criticisms. Section 1.8 
summarizes the main findings of this chapter. 
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1.2 Genesis of the Term Informal Sector 
Keith Hart, at the time a lecturer of Social Anthropology with the Overseas 
Development Group at the University of East Anglia, Norwich first coined the 
term 'informality' in his 1970 article on the small scale entrepreneurs of Ghana 
published in Journal of Development Studies,. By this, Hart meant the low-
income economic activities of the urban sub-proletariat population in Accra, 
Ghana. More specifically, Hart singled-out the urban service providers who are 
rarely organized in a way an established 'firm' would be. Hart primarily studied 
Frafras, a migrant Mole-Dagbane linguistic group living in the savannah region of 
Northern Ghana, which constituted about 3% of Ghanaian population at the time 
of the study. Small scale indigenous entrepreneurs providing heterogeneous 
services had been the major constitutive part of the Ghanaian urban 
'unorganized' sector. But Hart points to two main reasons for this sector being 
left out of the ambit of central planning; on one hand, the sheer variety of 
occupations in the 'unorganized' sector made it incomprehensible to the 
development planning body and on the other, it was the western ethnocentric 
view of what an entrepreneur means. Indigenous entrepreneurs were never seen 
as anything but petty traders, and thus, were always considered to be in line to 
get into the formal 'countable' workforce. Hart effectively pointed out that there 
are different layers of exploitation even in the production relationships prevailing 
in the unorganized sector, although he is insistent upon differentiating between 
the exploitation of a wage worker in a formal firm and that within a society where 
obligations are diffuse and fundamentally reciprocal. For example, a Ghanaian 
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entrepreneur may often underpay the co-villagers he employs in his road-building 
project, yet it generates livelihood for the employees who were otherwise left out 
of the jurisdiction of central planning. A Ghanaian trader can often be found guilty 
of hoarding and avoiding taxation, yet he helps his otherwise destitute fellow 
kinsmen in feeding their families. For this reason, Hart argues that the use and 
often exploitation of, say, kinship relationships for personal gain is not 
necessarily similar to the exploitation of 'formal' workers employed in a factory. 
Nevertheless, Hart is wary of idealizing either kind of exploitation. Hart does not 
find it wise to consider one kind of exploitation as better than the other. 
Again, in the 1973 study of the Frafras, Hart argued that price inflation, 
inadequate wages and an increasing surplus of labor to the requirement of the 
urban labor market have been the reason leading to the growing informality of 
the urban income-generating activities of the sub-proletariat population of Accra, 
Ghana. 
Hart proposed that the income and expenditure patterns in the presence 
of informality are much more complex than in a 'formal' economy. In the absence 
of sufficient income, a large part of the working urban population very commonly 
engaged in multiple jobs and/or work for longer hours. Such arrangements were 
possible through informal understanding between the worker and the time and 
work-record keepers. Some of the multiple jobs held by a worker would 
frequently be both within as well as outside the organized labor force. In other 
words, the opportunity structure of the formal sector denied a positive margin 
between the income and expenditure for a large working population. Thus, 
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informality is generated as a response to the 'failure' of the formal sector to 
generate sufficient livelihood, according to Hart. For Hart, informality is primarily 
an urban phenomenon. Also, illegitimacy, that is evasion of the law at some point 
of informal activities, has been all-pervasive in the population that Hart had 
studied. 
The size of the informal sector varies across countries, but it is central to 
the understanding of the development processes. When development is 
interpreted as the process of a widening industrial base and diminishing the size 
of the agricultural sector, it is easy to see the 'informal' economic activities as 
peripheral and transient. Such an outlook often results in claiming the 'scarcity of 
entrepreneurs', while, on the contrary, Hart argued that a re-defining of the term 
'entrepreneur' is crucial to account for the contributions of the 'informal' economic 
activities to the development of a region. 
Hernando De Soto (1989) has emphasized the similar point of defining 
entrepreneur, but from a different perspective. For De Soto, everyone who 
produces and sells something in the market should be considered as an 
entrepreneur. State should not bind any such entrepreneurial activity in legalities, 
as that dampens the entrepreneurial incentive of people. Thus for De Soto, state 
legislation appears to be a hindrance in the way of realizing full-fledged 
development of businesses, and therefore the productive capacity of an 
economy. 
The next section discusses various definitions of the informal sector, 
particularly with respect to the role of the state and its regulations. 
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1.3 Definition(s) of Informal Sector 
The term 'informal' has been defined in various different, sometimes 
related ways. Keith Hart, the Social Anthropologist identified as one who first 
used the term 'informal', defines this sector as predominantly the urban service 
providing sector in the context of Third World, which works outside the formal 
institutional arrangements. In the study of the Frafras migrated from the northern 
Ghana to the Ghanaian capital Accra, Hart (1970, 1973) emphasizes his use of 
the term 'informal' is synonymous with the urban self-employed population, who 
earn a living outside the formal wage economy. This definition entails an almost 
incomprehensible heterogeneity of economic activities, which Hart recognizes. 
No distinction is made between an illegal migrant construction worker and a 
street-side food vendor selling one pot of food each day. Moreover, this definition 
does not provide any clear idea about how to understand and categorize the 
hoarding or bribery of a registered entrepreneur. 
The International Labor Organization (1972) published a report on Kenyan 
employment situation, where informality is defined as any activity that avoids 
government regulations and taxes. According to this definition, informal economy 
would be much larger than what it is according to Hart's definition (1970, 1973). 
This is because anyone who avoids regulations and/or taxes would be a part of 
the informal economy, even if that person is officially registered as a formal 
sector employee. Initially, according to ILO, the informal sector was aimed at 
providing subsistence to families and it was looked at as a 'problem'. This view of 
12 
informal sector as a 'problem' has prevailed for the larger part of the past forty 
years. The ILO argued that (formal) employment generation and reducing income 
inequality are the only two ways to 'solve' the problem of 'informal sector'. 
Such view of the informal sector as a 'problem' privileges a legal construct 
over a structural determination. If legality is to be considered the parameter of 
measuring formality and/or informality, it leads to severe undermining of the 
creativity and the capacity of livelihood generation of billions of world's 
population, just because they do not follow state regulations. It also moves our 
gaze away from the incapability of the formal sector to include them as legal 
workforce. 
The informal sector has also been defined as an entity that does not have 
any legal status. Such importance on regulatory framework has first been put by 
Hernando De Soto (1989). In his much cited and celebrated book, "The Other 
Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World", De Soto studies the Peruvian 
urban economy in the capital city of Lima and maintains that it is the migrants 
from the rural areas, who constitute the informal economy.1 De Soto emphasizes 
the role of state regulations in creating the space for illegality, and thereby, 
informality.2 For him, the 'mercantile' state stands as an impediment to 
businesses. Without the state and its regulations, even the street vendor would 
be able to realize her/his enormous potential as an entrepreneur. In other words, 
' Raul Zibechi (2010) provides an account of the urban informal economy of 
Salvador, Brazil. 
2
 De Soto (1989), Chapter 1, Pp xiv. 
13 
the restriction on individual freedom by the state is responsible for the 
underdeveloped conditions of informal economic activities. Therefore, a complete 
retreat of the state and abolition of regulations would be the conditions for 
blurring the distinction between formal and informal activities, and thus building 
the capacity of the informal economy. 
The informal economy has grown into being a common sense notion. Yet, 
it seems hard to put forth a complete and concise definition of this sector. Two 
prominent sociologists, Manuel Castells and Alejandro Portes have laid out a 
compelling conceptualization of the informal economy. Understanding the 
informal economy as a process rather than an object is a better way to 
acknowledge its historical realities, according to Castells and Portes (1989). For 
them, it is too simplistic to identify the informal economy as an area merely for 
survival activities of marginalized and destitute people. Rather, it is economically 
dynamic and a source of significant income generation though in an unregulated 
fashion. It is true that a lot of people engage in such unregulated economic 
activity out of desperation, but such desperation for survival can be found in the 
formal economy too. For example, a lower ranked security personnel or a lower 
division clerk, who are part of the formal economy often accept a wage reduction 
in order to hold on to their secured job. The range of variety of occupations that 
fall into the category of informal can sometimes encompass such economic 
activities that earn an income higher than many formal occupations. In that 
sense, poverty is not a unique characterization of the informal economy. 
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The informal economic activities comprise of specific forms of production 
relationship, employing a huge number of workers in both advanced 
industrialized as well as less developed countries. Thus, informal sector may 
include both a street-food vendor and a temporary employee in the Silicon 
Valley. Castells and Portes were among the first researchers who moved away 
from the traditional notions of economic dualism and social marginality when it 
comes to the study of informal economic activities. They have attempted to 
redefine the production relations that fall under the realm of informal sector. 
The prevalence of a single worker being engaged in both formal and 
informal economic activities makes it impossible to define informality as a 
characteristic of individual workers. A single worker employed in a formal 
unionized firm can also work as informal cash-for-service plumber (or a mechanic 
or a private tutor or any other occupation) in a single day or in different time of a 
month or a year. Hence, the central feature differentiating formal from informal 
work is that the latter is unregulated by the institutions of the society, in a legal 
and social environment. This is the main observation of Castells and Portes. 
Such a feature emphasizes the precedence of the existence of a formal 
economy; in the sense that informal economy exists because there is a formal 
part of the economy. In other words, it is the institutional regulatory apparatus 
that leads individual actors to try to escape it by engaging more and more into 
informal economy.3 This logic tells us that if there were no institutionalization or 
regulation of any kind, there would not be any difference between formal and 
3
 Castells and Portes (1989), pp. 12-13. 
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informal economy. The emphasis here is on the positive relationship between the 
extent of institutional regulation and that of informality. Hernando De Soto (1989) 
argues the same, in favor of the elimination of all state regulative apparatus. It 
implies that informality would tend to decrease if regulations are reduced. 
But this logic tends to fail in explaining the real-world experience of the 
countries with their respective informal sectors. Once a country adopts open 
economic policies, institutional regulations tend to loosen up gradually. All the 
sectors including trade, agriculture, finance etc. are subjected to the free-market 
reforms, in order to reduce the regulatory costs. A majority of the developing 
countries have undertaken such reforms. But contrary to the logic explained 
above, the informal economy has grown in size. For example, in India, the 
informal economy has grown from engaging 40% of the workforce to 93%, from 
1990 to 2005, 1991 being the year of adopting the open economic policies.4 This 
phenomenon has been recognized much earlier by Castells and Portes (1989) 
too in the Latin American countries, and according to them, it is a novel social 
trend, different from the conventional view of informality. Castells and Portes 
summarizes the conventional view as the following, the informal sector is just a 
'lag' from traditional production relationships, which is not quite a traditional 
sector, rather a temporary reservoir of labor waiting in transit between the 
traditional and the modern formal sector. Tokman (2006, 2007) is one of the most 
prominent researchers who argue such conventional view of the informal sector. 
For Tokman (2006, 2007), informal sector is in need of an overhauling of policies 
4
 National Commission for Enterprises in Unorganized Sector (2007) 
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that will increase the capability of the informal workers to integrate into the 
modernization process. The modernization process is never clearly defined, but 
the lack of entrepreneurial capacity of the informal workers is pointed as pre-
modern. It is precisely this view of the capacity of the informal sector that Keith 
Hart (1970, 1973) vehemently criticized. 
This new phenomenon of a growing informal economy while institutional 
regulations are dwindling, has established itself through the expansion of formal-
informal subcontracted relationships. Chris Birkbeck (1979) and Juan Carlos 
Fortuna and Susana Prates (1989), in their studies of Colombian and Uruguayan 
informal economies respectively, have argued that informal activities are a form 
of disguised wage labor that denies the laborers the basic rights common to even 
a traditional proletarian work relationship. 
Although institutional regulations, such as labor regulations that provide 
bargaining power to the workers, trade barriers that protect domestic producers 
from foreign competition, financial sector regulations where state has a greater 
control over credit distribution etc. are in a gradual decline in majority of the 
developing economies, the extent of the existing regulations is still not negligible. 
The persistence and growth of informality in this context raises another pertinent 
question. Contrary to the claim that exploitative and uncontrolled work 
relationships are not a feature of advanced capitalism, we observe the increase 
in the number of sweatshops, export processing zones and special economic 
zones in the developing countries. On one hand, it contradicts the notion that 
regulations are still large enough, and on the other, it shows that the policies of 
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advanced capitalism have created a situation where intense competition has 
brought forward informal arrangements to reduce cost. 
Castells and Portes have been two of the most prominent proponents of 
the view that 'informal' sector is neither peripheral nor transient; on the contrary, 
it is an integral component of any national economy, particularly in the 
developing nations.5 
Marxist writings have been of the view that workers engaged in informal 
economic activities are disguised proletarians, who face exploitation just like 
formal sector workers, but only through indirect channels. Contrary to the dual 
economy framework proposed by the neoclassical economics, Marxist 
approaches considered the informal sector as a 'socially and historically 
determined mode of production subordinated to and subsumed by capitalism.'6 
When people are forced to work for livelihood without any protection by trade 
unions or by the state, their idea of 'common interest' weakens. Therefore, 
informal economic activities act as an obstacle to collective solidarity and political 
mobilization (Bonacich and Light, 1991, Fernandez-Kelly 2006). Again, according 
to Sanyal and Bhattacharya (2009), the threat of capital moving towards places 
those allow it to provide lesser wages and work standards results in a race to the 
bottom. In their 2009 essay, Sanyal and Bhattacharya argue that the study of 
labor is almost always about wage-labor, whereas the postcolonial developing 
5
 Castells and Portes discuss the centrality and extent of growth of the informal 
sector in Latin American countries in much detail, in their 1989 book, pp 15-24. 
6
 Wilson (1998), pp. 5. 
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world is incomprehensible with such a singular characterization of labor. This is 
particularly relevant in the studies on informal labor. Since the prevalent type of 
labor in the developing world is self-employment, the typical form of wage 
employment in capitalist production sphere is insufficient to understand self-
employment. The alienation of labor from capital common to the capitalist theory 
of production proves to be inapplicable to the self-employed workers.7 This is 
increasingly becoming a challenge for researchers and policy makers because of 
the growth of this extra-capitalist space. Sanyal and Bhattacharya describes 
informal sector as follows, 
[l]t is asserting its presence as one in which a large section of the 
population reproduces the material conditions of their ever-
precarious existence by engaging in concrete economic activities 
governed by a logic that is fundamentally different from the one that 
animates the world of capitalist production.8 
Again, the dependency theory had viewed the informal sector in yet 
another different way. The impost-substitution and export-orientation policies 
required to import heavy machinery. The sophisticated technology led to higher 
capital-labor ration, thereby creating a surplus labor force. The more capital 
intensive the production processes became, the lesser the scope of formal sector 
employment were (Wilson, 1998). This unleashed a process of employment 
generation with a low capital-labor ratios, unskilled as well as unremunerated 
7
 Sanyal and Bhattacharya (2009), pp. 35 
8
 Sanyal and Bhattacharya (2009), pp. 36. 
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family labor, easy entry, low star-up costs, low labor productivity and simpler 
technology. This sector is conceptualized as the informal sector, which may or 
may not interact with the formal sector for fulfilling the requirement of inputs and 
selling the finished product. According to the dependency theorists, particularly 
the researchers at the PREALC (Regional Program for Employment in Latin 
America and the Caribbean), small-scale manufacturers of the informal sector 
will be displaced by modern capitalist industries, whereas it will take longer for 
the large-scale commercial establishments to replace the service providers and 
the small commercial establishments such as vendors (Wilson 1998). 
Jan Breman (1996) have defined informal sector not as a primarily urban 
economic issue. In writings including that of Hart and De Soto, informality was 
generated by rural-urban migration. Breman criticized such a conception of 
informality, and emphasized the existence of a rural informal sector. For Breman, 
it is no longer a subset of urban economy, rather was both a rural and urban 
phenomenon. When the rural informal economy is overlooked, the concept of 
informality partly loses its policy relevance, according to Breman.9 Without the 
inclusion of rural informal economy into the definition of informality, we lose sight 
of one of the largest arenas of informal activity, namely, agriculture. It is incorrect 
to consider non-agrarian economic activities as tied to the urban economy. For 
example, traditional occupations such as artisans, craftsmen, goldsmiths, 
blacksmiths, potters, and bullock-cart drivers have been significant in the third-
world countryside (Kundu, Sarangi and Das, 2003). The rural non-agrarian 
9
 Jagannathan (1987) also emphasizes the same point. 
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economy is anything but trivial. For example, in India, by the end of 1980s, such 
economic activities generated livelihood for one out of every four male and for 
one out of every six female rural working person.10 
Barbara Harris-White and Anushree Sinha (2007) provide a more clarified 
and comprehensive definition of informal economy. According to them, informal 
economy involves the processes of producing goods and services that are not 
state-regulated, are legitimate (and sometimes black or illegal too) and compete 
with the goods and services of the formal economy. This economy includes petty 
trade, subsistence production, and small-scale commercial production along with 
the casualization of labor by the formal entrepreneurs. Harris-White and Sinha 
argue, in line with Castells and Portes (1989), that informal economy should be 
considered as a permanent feature of the growth process. Also, Harris-White 
(2002, 2003) point towards the highly differentiated nature of informal economy, 
as have other researchers like Castells and Portes (1989) and Breman (1996). 
Informal accumulation and extensive informal labor market exist in large 
economic spaces created and protected for petty productions, trade, services 
that do not lead to accumulation and do not entail any right. 
Chadha (1993), pp 324-5. 
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1.4 Origin of Informal Sector 
Almost all the researchers are of the view that the causes of the process 
of Informalization must be traced within the specific historical, social, economic 
and political experiences of each country or region in question. Despite this, 
some common themes seem to resonate in the studies in informal sectors of 
various countries. 
The most commonly prevailing idea is that the structural changes an 
economy experiences gives rise to a transient and peripheral cluster of 'cottage 
industries', which is called 'informal' or 'unorganized' sector. For example, the 
structural changes brought about by the global economic crisis of 1970s and later 
by the structural adjustment policies adopted by the developing countries are 
usually considered the factors behind the 'creation' of informal economy. This 
notion may be true, but only partly. A number of countries, both in the developed 
as well as developing world, already had a sizable population working in the 
same occupations and in the similar 'unorganized' manner even before such 
structural changes came into place. For example, about 46% of the working 
population earned their living by engaging in informal activities in the Latin 
American countries in 1950. 11 Also, around 50% of the US working population 
was involved in informal sector in 1950, which stands at around 30% in 1980.12 
The informal activities are defined as those undertaken for survival of the families 
11
 Castells and Portes 1989 combine information from various sources in Table 
1.1, pp 17. 
12
 Castells and Portes 1989, Table 1.2, pp 19 
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of the worker using very little capital and extensive family labor, and activities that 
are at the edge of the law (Castells and Portes, 1989). Similar situation prevailed 
in European countries like Italy and Spain, for example, where significant number 
of people worked in unregistered 'firms' that generated livelihood for the workers 
along with significant volume of exports.13 Hence, the structural economic 
changes may have resulted in the growth of the informal economy, but it cannot 
fully explain the 'origin' of it. 
The use and 'misuse' of power by the labor unions seem to be the second 
important reason behind the genesis of 'informal' economy, according to a 
number of authors. For example, Sebastian Brusco in his 1982 article in 
Cambridge Journal of Economics explains that the rising power of the left-wing 
labor unions starting in the mid-1960s had led to rapid vertical disintegration and 
more decentralization in the Emilia-Romagna region of Italy. Researchers like 
Sabel (1982), Castells (1980), Sassen-Koob (1988) also have identified the 
impact of unionization on the interest of corporate capitalism and the resultant 
process of subcontracting and Informalization. But Castells and Portes (1989) 
and Sassen-Koob (1984, 1988) are cautious about not considering unionization 
as a singular reason for the genesis of informal economy. Unionization, at the 
most, has been a problem for the business-owners as the former became an 
obstacle to capital accumulation of the latter. The case of the automobile firm Fiat 
is an example of this. Fiat, after facing reduced profit, shut-down production in its 
own factories and increased subcontracting and multiple sourcing, as a response 
13
 Castells and Portes 1989, Table 1.4, pp 24. 
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to the social victories of the Italian labor unions starting in 1969 (Brusco, 1982; 
Sabel, 1982; Capecchi, 1989). 
Thus, one of the reasons which partly explain the genesis of the informal 
economy is unionization. The question that arises here is that, why, then, do we 
see a growth of informal economic activities in the developing countries that have 
undergone significant labor reform?14 Contrary to what we should expect given 
the conflict of interest between unionization and corporate interest, we see a 
much more rapid growth of Informalization in places where labor unions have 
been made illegal or illegitimate. The Latin American countries that have 
undertaken labor market reform have not shown any different tendency than 
what countries that have not yet embraced such reform have shown. Moreover, if 
we look at the sectors that are experiencing faster and higher extent of 
Informaljzation, we see that firms in such sectors (special economic zones with 
various assembly line productions, restaurants, construction, urban service 
providers etc.) were small and quite less unionized (Morales and Mines 1985, 
Stepick 1989). Hence, some other reason must be there that answers such 
apparent contradiction and answers the above-mentioned question. 
The third reason could be the impact of international competition on 
domestic firms. As the national economies integrate more and more, domestic 
firms find subcontracting and employing casual labors a way of reducing costs. 
This is perhaps one of the most cited reason in a number of recent studies in 
14
 Here labor reform implies deregulation of labor market, with elimination of strict 
minimum wage and reduction of legal protection to the workers (Edwards, 2005). 
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informal economy (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2003, Marjit 2003, Marjit and Maiti 
2006 are prominent among others). This reason draws on another potential 
factor giving rise to informalization, the structural economic changes discussed 
earlier. Such structural changes have been accompanied by a large part of the 
working population becoming unemployed through contraction of formal 
employment (IDRC documentation, and a lot of other case studies in informal 
sector of various countries tell the similar story) and lose bargaining power to the 
point of accepting any remuneration that is greater than zero. If the previously 
employed population had not lost bargaining power, it would have been hard for 
the businesses facing foreign competition to use the process of cutting labor cost 
as the major way to keep up competitiveness in the integrated world market. 
Nevertheless, the structural changes economies have undergone prove to be an 
irreversible process, in the sense that, the disenfranchised population is never 
absorbed back into the formal economy even after the economic crisis is over. 
Those people continue living at the margins of the rules and organizational 
arrangements even when the income of the nation starts to grow once again 
(Massey and Meagan 1982). According to Castells and Portes, 
The small-scale and face-to-face features of these activities make 
living through the crisis a more manageable experience than 
waiting in line for relief from impersonal bureaucracies (Castells 
and Portes 1989, pp 29). 
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The similar lack of bargaining power is also seen at the national level, 
where any increase or proper enforcement of any sort of state regulation is 
enough for capital investment and therefore foreign businesses to move away 
from the country. Special economic zones15 established in a number of 
developing countries are relevant to consider in this matter. If China or India does 
not allow the special economic zones to operate according to the 'special' rules, 
foreign businesses find themselves free to leave.16 Obtaining comparative 
advantage over competitors and vis-a-vis own formal regulations leads the newly 
industrialized countries to Informalization. 
A fourth reason may be the reaction of the businesses to the state 
regulation, in terms of tax, social legislation, health and environment. Businesses 
find any and all regulations put in place by a welfare state as hindrance to capital 
accumulation. In short, welfare state is the reason for the movement of vertical 
disintegration that businesses have undertaken in post World War II period. But 
this may raise a relevant question, as to whether there was no informalization 
pre-welfare state world. 
A lack of research seeks to trace back the reason behind the genesis of 
informal sector beyond a point or try to answer the above-mentioned question. 
15
 Special economic zones are like sanctuaries, only difference is that it is for big 
businesses. Productions in such zones are allowed to operate in a virtually free, 
zero-regulation market for labor, other inputs, and infrastructure. This includes 
the arbitrariness of setting the input costs including wages. 
16
 Wong (1982) provides a detailed analysis of Chinese special economic zones. 
Agarwal (2007), Banerjee-Guha (2008) among others analyze the economy of 
the Indian Special economic zones. 
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Most, if not all, studies explore the reason in the adjustment of the businesses 
with the regulatory dynamics of an economy. I extend their analysis one step 
further to find out the answer to the above-mentioned question. 
It would be erroneous to claim that Informalization is a post-World War II, 
or, to be more specific, a post-welfare state process. Colonial histories from the 
African, Latin American as well as Asian countries prove the opposite, that is, 
small-scale 'unrecorded' or 'unregistered' entrepreneurship was a common 
phenomenon. The reason for those being 'unorganized' is the absence of any 
book-keeping modern state. Thus, looking for reasons behind the 'origin' (and not 
'growth') of the informal economy in the reaction of the businesses either to 
unionization or to state regulations would not provide a complete explanation. 
Unregulated and unorganized small-scale economic activities were always 
already present in an economy before any central authority began any 
sociological survey or started collecting data or information. Any historical 
account of economic activities and occupations prevailing in a country would 
reveal the extent of their informal economy. Almost all types of informal economic 
activity (including illegitimate ones) were present, for example, in the Indian 
subcontinent even prior to the colonial rule. For example, the spice producers, 
the farmers, the food processors, craftsmen all were 'unregulated'.17 When post-
colonial capital tried to succeed other modes of production, it needed to create 
17
 A number of old economic accounts mention such 'casual' or 'unregulated' 
occupations, including Dutt (1902), Habib (1982, 2006), Habib and Raychaudhuri 
(1982), Kumar and Desai (1983), Thapar (1980), and Basu and Sen (2008). 
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'zones' where the profit can be confined, to ensure its reinvestment. In an 
economy with various unorganized non-capitalist economic activities, such 
'zoning' were possible through the redefining of the ownerships of the means of 
production. For example, an automobile factory can be built on a piece of land 
which is used by a family (for agricultural purposes, cattle grazing or for pottery 
purposes) for generations, only through the transfer of ownership of the land.18 
Such zoning also redefined what is formal and what is informal. In this sense, 
inability to account for 'all' type and scale of occupations seem inherent to 
capitalist production processes. 
My attempt here is to shift away from the conventional method of 
researching reason for the genesis of Informalization in the reaction of 
businesses to regulations. It is not to deny the role of businesses in responding 
to various types of regulations through greater Informalization, but to point out 
the incompleteness of the reasons found in this way. In other words, I want to 
emphasize the inability of the reasons found in such ways (already discussed 
earlier) in explaining the 'genesis'. The discussion of the genesis of informal 
sector often instead diverts towards the analysis of the 'growth' of Informalization. 
It is necessary to think beyond the traditional 'business-first' approach (by which I 
mean the approach to think about businesses as something that existed 
historically, at least prior to the occupations that fall under the category of non-
capitalist 'unorganized' activities) to find our answer, and recognize that historical 
18
 Acquisition of land, forest, hills and mines have become increasingly significant 
for industrialization in developing countries. Such transfer of ownership proves 
the pre-existence of non-capitalist 'unorganized' economic activities. 
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accounts vouch for the existence and prevalence of 'unregulated' small-scale 
entrepreneurial activities in a time before the modern welfare state became 
reality. Hence it is crucial to understand the chronology in a reversed manner, 
that is, 'informal' or 'unorganized' economy precedes 'formal' economy. Then, the 
'genesis' of informality becomes a historical, rather than an economic question. 
The late David Gordon (1972) appropriately noted that, 
[T]he distinction between the two sectors is not so much 
technologically but historically determined.19 
Informality is what characterizes various historical occupations, such as 
vendors, porters, garbage collectors, service providers (barbers, cobblers, 
janitors, blacksmiths, potters, teachers, mechanics etc.), prostitutes etc. and 
these were already generating livelihood for enormous sections of the population 
in a number of countries, and before the capitalist production system became 
central driving force. Welfare state, with its legal framework is a much newer 
political entity that created the enclaves of modern industrial production and 
government administration. Informality is a system older than both the capitalist 
economic system and the political entity named welfare state. Thus, if we are to 
find the 'origin' of informal sector in the reaction of formal businesses, we are 
essentially following the 'formal-first-informal-second' chronology, which is likely 
to result in an incomplete analysis, as I have shown here. Conceptualizing the 
19Gordon (1972), pp.47. 
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origin of informality solely as an effect of modernization would be both incorrect 
and incomplete. Jan Breman (1996) would argue that it is the emergence of 
formal sector employment that requires explanation, rather than informal 
economy.20 
No single reason can be sufficient to explain the genesis and growth of the 
informal economy. At the least, it is a combination of various factors described 
earlier. Informality is at the same time the legacy of colonial domination, a 
footprint of pre-capitalist social formations and part and parcel of the more 
contemporary capitalist growth process. 
1.5 Trade Reforms and Indian Informal Sector 
Trade Reforms policies had been adopted by the government of India in 
1991. It works as a natural experiment for those who want to study the responses 
to such a change in policies from various sectors on an economy. Numerous 
studies have been conducted to understand the phenomenon of changing 
national economic policies from being an inward-looking to globalized, as well as 
the impact on the economic performance of the country. But the number of 
studies has been far fewer that explores the impact on the informal sector, 
particularly on the income opportunities available in this sector. This section 
highlights the understanding so far of the trade reforms policies of India and 
reviews a set of most prominent literature on its impact on the informal sector. 
Breman (1996), pp. 5. 
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1.5.1 Trade Reforms as a Component of Structural Adjustment Program 
Trade reforms have been an important component of the policies 
adopted by majority of the developing countries starting in late 1970s. Such set 
of policies were called the Structural Adjustment Program. This section discusses 
the origin of the Structural Adjustment Program and reason for its implementation 
in the developing countries. 
Until the mid 1970s the third world countries were borrowing heavily from 
the banks and financial institutions in the first world. It was the period when 
majority of those countries became independent and were learning to build their 
own nations. The developing countries in the post war period were known for 
experimenting with various inward-looking economic policies, viz., the import 
substitution, export promotion, infant industry protection, and high trade barriers. 
The interest rate charges were rising sharply and the terms of trade, i.e., the ratio 
of prices paid and received for the goods and services traded were gradually 
moving against the borrower countries. By the end of the 1970s the accumulated 
debt of the third world countries increased the vulnerability of those poor nations 
as their creditworthiness declined. The late 1970s and early 1980s had seen the 
formulation and implementation of the stabilization measures designed by the 
two Bretton Woods institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Once the 
conditionalities of the IMF loan led the borrowing countries to reduce government 
spending, food and fuel prices soared and created social unrest in a number of 
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countries (SAFPRI, 2004). That is when the World Bank started to provide funds 
on conditions of structural and institutional reforms that would have gradual 
rather than immediate impact. Thus, the entire program had two phases. First it 
is the short-term macroeconomic stabilization and then comes the 
implementation of structural overhauling. Such stabilization measures are 
sometimes called the conditionalities (particularly by the IMF) and more popularly 
called Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The SAP generally imposes strict 
fiscal and monetary disciplines upon the borrower nations. It is also called the 
Washington Consensus, a term coined by economist John Williamson in 1989. 
The measures were designed to ensure the recovery of the loaned money, by 
generating savings and foreign exchange. It included measures of currency 
devaluation, trade liberalization, investment deregulation, and privatization of 
public utilities, marketing state enterprises, reforms of agricultural sector, 
financial sector and the labor market and liberalization of almost all domestic 
markets. In short, the SAP was targeted at reducing the role of the state. By 
1992, the total amount lent by the World Bank was $5847 million, which was 27% 
of the bank's total commitment. So far, more than 70 countries have been 
subjected to the SAP (IMF Report, 1999; SAFPRI, 2004). 
1.5.2 Trade Reforms: The Indian Experience 
In 1991, the ruling party, Indian National Congress, elected P.V. 
Narasimha Rao as the new prime minister, after the assassination of his 
predecessor Rajiv Gandhi. That very year saw a dramatic change in economic 
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policies, proposed by the Finance minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh. Before 1991, 
India was in the pursuit of inward-oriented economic strategies for the four 
decades following independence in 1947. Such insulation against foreign trade 
often has been referred to as a pessimistic and hostile attitude towards the 
conditions of globalization at large. In pre-1991 period, the import-weighted 
average of tariffs for all imports was 87%, with tariffs on some imports standing 
as high as 300%. It was 164% on consumer goods (Indian Ministry of Finance, 
2001). 
In the 1980s, India experienced moderate economic growth, but the fiscal 
deficit, along with foreign commercial debt and the debt service ratio showed a 
rising trend. The requirement of financing large capital expenditures and imports 
of machinery and raw materials and oil made India remain dependent heavily 
upon foreign borrowing. As a result, India has seen a steep rise in its foreign debt 
liabilities from $23.5 billion in 1980 to $83.8 billion in 1991 (Budget papers of 
India 1982-83, 1992-93). Almost 28% of total government revenue was spent on 
debt services. The problem aggravated when the world oil price rose sharply on 
the aftermath of the Gulf War, especially because oil accounted for the single 
largest imported item in India. The fiscal deficit grew from 6.3% of the GDP 
during the seventh five-year planning period (1985-1989) to 8.2% in 1990-91 
(Indian Planning Commission, 1989, 1991). The internal debt burden increased 
from 35% of the GDP in 1980 to 53% in 1990 (Indian Planning Commission, 
1991). Faced with the said crises, government of India adopted a major structural 
adjustment program in 1991. The reform came as a response to the external 
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payment problem and was a part of the IMF bailout condition. IMF insisted upon 
an immediate structural reform, while providing loans to India (Joshi, 1996; Dutt, 
2003). In October 1991, the Government of India got the approval of a standby 
arrangement of $2.3 billion for over a period of twenty months from the IMF, a 
$500 million Structural Adjustment loan with the World Bank and $250 million 
hydrocarbon sector loan with the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Budget 
reports of India 1992-93). Although the pace of the program was moderate in 
comparative perspectives, it was a very sharp one according to Indian record. 
The reform included replacement of import licensing with tradable import permits 
and a rapid reduction of tariff rates. It also proposed elimination of licensing for 
new entry and the expansion of capacity in manufacturing sector. Following the 
reform, the import-weighted average tariff rate for all imports declined to 24.6% in 
1996-97 and to 30.2% in 1999-2000. The new millennium brought abolition of 
quantity restrictions in most imports (Srinivasan, 2001; World Bank, 2000a Annex 
Table 6.6). The reform dramatically changed the across-industry tariff structure, 
by reducing the tariff differences across industries. This implies that the 
industries experiencing higher protection in the pre-reform period have seen 
higher tariff reduction. There have been reductions in non-tariff barriers (NTB) 
too, although the decline happened at a much slower pace, most of the 
elimination came by 1998. The government of India devalued rupee, the Indian 
currency, by 23 percent and cut down subsidies and transfers to public 
enterprises to reduce fiscal deficit, along with liberalizing the banking sector, 
forming the tax reform committee and gradual disinvestment of government 
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equity in profitable public sector enterprises. The government also adopted new 
market friendly industrial policy to open up more and more areas for private 
domestic and foreign investment (lEG-World Bank, 1996). 
1.5.3 Indian Informal Sector 
Informal economy in India is significantly large, incorporating various types 
of occupations and huge population. According to the International Labor 
Organization, the non-agricultural informal employment has been estimated at 
83% for the time period between 1994 and 2000 (ILO, 2002). According to the 
official statistics of India, the enterprises whose economic activities are 
unregulated and unrecorded by any legal provisions are called the unorganized 
enterprises (National Accounts Statistics, Government of India). Informal sector, 
thus, is perceived as a subset of the unorganized sector. Again, according to the 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), informal own-account firms and 
their employees constitute the informal sector. Under the 1949 Factories Act of 
India, firms that are registered, fall under the category of formal enterprises. Such 
a categorization carries ambiguity about the labor process. For example, a very 
small firm with fifteen workers can be registered and can have labor unions, while 
an unregistered firm can deny the entry of unions among a workforce of hundred. 
Another way by which informality has been recognized is the type of labor. For 
example, family labor is always recognized as informal, even in a registered 
enterprise (Adam and Harris-White, 2007). Existence of labor laws has been 
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another categorizing factor. All the registered firms in India are legally required to 
keep a set of labor laws and their very existence works as an incentive for 
employing casual workers (Adam and Harris-White, 2007). 
It took the government of India until 2004 to establish an organization 
devoted to the unorganized sector. It is the National Commission for enterprises 
in the Unorganized Sector (NCEUS). This was an important move from buying 
into the traditional idea of informal sector as a temporary holding ground for 
workers to wait for the 'proper' formal employment (ILO 1973). According to the 
NCEUS report, about 92 per cent of the total workforce of about 457 million was 
employed in the informal or unorganized sector as of 2004-05 (NCEUS, 2007). 
1.5.4 Impact of Trade Reforms on Informal Sector 
There is little doubt about the fact that informal sector has been a growing 
sector (Currie and Harrison, 1997; Stallings and Peres, 2000; Carr and Chen, 
2001; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Harris-White, 2003; Jhabvala et al. 2003; 
Sinha and Adam, 2007). In the available literature on informal sector and its 
response to the trade reforms policies, the size of the sector and its change has 
been the most studied question. Moreover, informal sectors in the Latin 
American countries have seen the maximum number of studies on the question 
of the impact of trade reform policies. 
Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) have studied a partial equilibrium model with 
dynamic efficiency wage for Brazil and Colombia. In their study, Goldberg and 
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Pavcnik consider the casually employed workers of the formal manufacturing 
sector as the informal sector, and using the data for 1980s and 1990s, their 
empirical analysis show no link between trade liberalization policies of Brazil and 
its informal employment. On the other hand, the Colombian informal sector has 
shown somewhat significant increase in its size in the time preceding the 
adoption of labor reform policies. The theory considers that the firms, facing 
demand uncertainty, hire workers from the pools of formal (protected by labor 
market legislations, and the cost of firing a formal worker is very high) and 
informal (cost of firing an informal worker is lower than a formal worker, as there 
are no benefit and legal protection) workforce. Formal workers usually receive 
efficiency wage, while the informal worker receive the reservation wage. 
Protected by the labor law, formal workers have tendency to shirk, which leads 
the firms to incur a higher cost for formal workers. Eventually, wages to the 
formal workers are higher than the informal wages. The firm maximizes profit 
subject to cost constraint. A comparative static analysis represents the negative 
impact of a price shock on employment. This result crucially depends upon the 
labor regulations, in the sense that a strict regulation leads to a larger negative 
impact of trade reforms on formal employment. The empirical analysis resulted in 
highlighting the role of labor reform policies as stated above. Therefore, Brazilian 
trade reform policies proved to be insignificant in increasing the size of informal 
employment. The informal employment grew in the post trade reforms period in 
Columbia, only for the time preceding labor reform. 
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Currie and Harrison (1997) was the predecessor of Goldberg and Pavcnik 
in terms of providing empirical analyses of the impact of trade reform policies on 
the size of the informal sector. Currie and Harrison studied the Moroccan 
informal sector after the trade liberalization policies were implemented, and found 
that formal enterprises increased the hiring of casual workers after the 
liberalization program was adopted. 
In a more recent paper, Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy (2007) empirically 
examined the impact of trade reforms in India on labor demand elasticities in the 
manufacturing sector. Using the data on employment and tariff rates from 1980-
1997, Hasan, Mitra and Ramaswamy estimate the labor demand function to find 
out that a declining trade barrier leads to an increasing labor demand elasticity 
and that the share of labor in output and value added has declined with trade 
reforms. Although this study does not focus on the informal labor, the negative 
relationship between tariff rates and labor demand elasticity is insightful. It 
implies that as trade barriers decrease, (formal) labor employment is expected to 
increase along with a decline in wages. Although the wages have gone down 
over the reform years in India, formal sector employment has not increased, 
which makes the distinction between the formal and informal labor unclear in this 
study.21 This study also finds out that the share of labor in output declines due to 
a decreasing bargaining power of labor in the manufacturing power. Evidently, 
higher authority of the manufacturing firms in hiring and firing of labor results in 
NCEUS 2007. 
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lower labor demand elasticity and therefore tends to contribute to the increase in 
informalization of labor. 
Contrary to what social scientists like Hart (1972), Jagannathan (1987), 
Castells and Portes (1989) argued, studies like Currie and Harrison (1997) 
and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2003) consider informality as a type of labor rather 
than as a type of occupation or work. Such an approach misses the huge 
population who work both in the formal and informal sector, seasonally, annually, 
monthly, or even daily. 
Apart from a number of partial equilibrium analyses, where informal sector 
meant only the casual/temporary workers employed by the formal firm to avoid 
providing any benefit beyond wages or any intervention of labor union, there are 
a few studies that consider informal sector as a separate sector. Sinha and Adam 
(2007) have done such an analysis of Indian economy. According to this study, 
around 88 per cent of Indian workers were engaged in informal activities and the 
informal sector, in 2003. This study emphasizes the importance of a 
macroeconomic analysis of the impact of trade reforms on informal sector. Sinha 
and Adam present a computable general equilibrium model using the data set 
from the Social Accounting Matrix framework generated in Sinha, Siddiqui and 
Munjal (2007). The Sinha and Adam Computable General Equilibrium model 
examines trade liberalization as economic shocks and analyze the economic 
ramifications of those shocks in a static framework. The relative higher labor 
intensity in informal firms characterizes the difference between the technical 
aspects of production in formal and informal firms. The economy consists of two 
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sectors, one that produces high technology good, which is formal, and the other 
one, the informal sector produces a relatively low technology good. The informal 
sector pays no tax, unlike its formal counterpart. The case studies that have been 
used to build the social accounting matrix show that formal sector worker earn 
about 3.5 times more than the informal sector workers. The usual assumptions of 
perfect competition and full employment are made in this study. The results show 
an expansion of informal employment. 
The next section describes the findings of the studies that have explored 
the wage impact of trade reforms. 
1.5.5 Trade Reforms and Indian Informal Sector Wages 
Studies that have focused upon the role trade reforms played in affecting 
the informal sector, were mostly interested in understanding whether the informal 
sector grows in the post trade reforms period. Few of them have looked beyond 
the issue of size, to understand the economic development issues relating the 
informal sector. Those who have studied the wage impact of trade liberalization 
policies, Kelley (1994) and Marjit (2003) are two most relevant researches. Their 
results are contradictory, just like their approaches. 
Kelley (1994) developed a computable general equilibrium model for the 
Peruvian economy. He suggests that although the informal sector is significantly 
large in size and its economic importance is undeniable in the developing 
countries, there is a serious dearth of understanding about the macroeconomic 
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implications of informal activities. This has partly been due to the lack of data or 
information. But conversely, the lack of macroeconomic approach has created 
such lack of information. The main result of Kelly's study is that the informal 
sector income, along with the formal sector output decreases as trade is 
liberalized and foreign competition is on the rise. This is due to the initial 
difference between the formal and the informal sector wages. Such difference 
causes informal output to replace its formal counterpart. Workers remaining in 
the formal pool of employment receive higher real wage, but the displaced 
workers and those who are in the informal production activities suffer losses. 
According to Kelley, informal sector workers are better served by policies when 
they are placed within the macroeconomic framework. This anticipation is based 
upon the idea that once informal sector is within the reach of policies, informal 
production is supposed to decrease and formal employment is supposed to grow. 
In pther words, re-replacement of informal activities by formal production is the 
only way for the economic development of informal workers. But despite such 
macroeconomic placement of informal sector, it is still on the rise in the 
developing countries and formal employment has not been able to grow enough 
to replace informal activities. Therefore, Kelley's anticipation remains unfulfilled. 
Among the studies that have looked into the impact of liberalized trade 
regime on the informal sector wages in India, Marjit (2003) is the most prominent 
one. This study is the most important reference point for the current study as 
described in chapter 2. Marjit proposes a simple general equilibrium model to 
understand the wage impact of a tariff reduction. The research question asked in 
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this study is what happens to the informal sector wage when the formal sector 
output falls due to a fall in its price. The formal sector output price reflects a 
falling tariff barrier as this is the import competing sector. Marjit shows that 
informal sector wage is supposed to rise along with the informal sector 
employment. The requirement for this result to hold is the immobility of capital 
between the formal and the informal sector. 
A three sector small open economy is proposed, where there is one 
formal, one informal and one agricultural sector. The formal sector is import 
competing, the informal sector is non-traded, and the agricultural sector is export 
sector. The model is specified as below. For the sake of convenience, the model 
is reproduced here with the notations used in the model proposed in chapter 2. 
Sector 1: import-competing formal manufacturing sector producing output 
X, using formal labor, capital (Kx) and an intermediate good Y produced by the 
informal sector. This sector is capital intensive. 
Sector 2: non-traded informal manufacturing sector producing 
intermediate good Y for the formal sector, using informal labor and capital (K) 
This sector is capital intensive too. 
Sector 3: export sector producing output A, using informal labor and 
capital (K). 
The assumptions are that capital is sector specific, i.e. Kx ^ K. Also, 
resources are fully employed, i.e. there is no unemployment; the labor market 
always clears. The wage paid to the formal labor employed in the formal sector is 
institutionally determined by the negotiations between the labor unions and the 
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employer firms, whereas the wage earned by the informal worker is competitively 
determined. Clearly, formal wage (W» is greater than the informal wage (W|). 
The prices of the outputs X, Y and A are Px, PY and PA respectively. The rental 
rate of capitals Kx and K are r and R respectively. The total stock of capital and 
labor in the economy is K and L respectively. Px* represents the foreign price. 
The price system is given as: 
aLxWF + aKxr + aYXPY = Px(1 +t) = Px* ... (1) 
aLYW|+aKYR = PY ...(2) 
aLAW| + aKAR = PA ...(3) 
The full-employment conditions are given as: 
aLx X + aLY Y + aLA A = L ...(4) 
aKxX=K x ...(5) 
aKYY + aKAA=K ...(6) 
The demand-supply balance in sector Y is given as: 
Yd = aYXX = Ys = Y ...(7) 
aij is defined as the unit input requirements, that is, the amount of unit i needed to 
produce one unit of output j . aYX is assumed to be fixed. Kx and L are substitutes. 
Given Px, PA, L, K, Kx and WF, we can determine W|, R, r, PY, X, A and Y. 
Determination of the general equilibrium is possible in the following manner. 
Given a PY, r is determined from equation (1). X is determined from equation (5). 
ay are determined from the given factor prices as there exists the assumption of 
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constant returns to scale technology. Therefore how much labor is formally 
employed and how much is informal can also be determined. Y and X are 
determined from equations (4) and (5). W| and R are determined from equations 
(2) and (3). Once Y is known, Yd is known too. If PY is arbitrary, Yd and Ys will not 
match. In that case, the excess demand function is given as follows, 
Yd(PY) = Ys(PY) = E(PY) ...(8) 
Equation (7) holds if and only if E (PY) = 0. Let, this is true for PY = PYe, 
that is a particular price of Y that clears the market of Y. If PYe exists and PYe > 0, 
then the entire system is solved. 
The comparative static analysis looks at the impact of a lowered Px on the 
informal wage W|. The import competing manufacturing formal sector is protected 
by tariff. A policy of deregulation or liberalization will lower the price of this sector 
(Px). A process of contraction of X will start. As a result, labor will leave sector X 
and will crowd in sector Y or A. Since capital is sector specific in this model, Kx 
stays stuck in sector X. Capital is specific to sectors Y and A, therefore Yd will 
fall, Ys will rise, leading to a fall in PYe. If Y is capital intensive relative to A, R will 
fall and W| will rise, according to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (which says 
that a rise in the prices of a commodity will increase the real reward of the factor 
used intensively in the sector and decrease the real reward of the other factor)22. 
Again, as X contracts, Yd falls, labor moves to Y and A. If Y is capital intensive, Y 
contracts and A expands. Therefore, according to the Rybczynsky theorem 
Wong (1995), pp. 31. 
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(which says that, for constant commodity and factor prices, an increase in the 
endowment of a factor will increase by a greater proportion the output of the 
sector which uses the factor intensively, and decrease the output of the other 
sector, given there is no factor intensity reversal, production diversification)23, W| 
may fall. Thus the impact on W| becomes ambiguous. 
However, if formal labor share in total employment is negligible and if Y is 
capital intensive, a fall in Pxwill lead to a rise in nominal and real informal wage. 
Form the price system and the full employment conditions, the 
expressions for the price of Y and the informal wage are obtained as the 
following: 
»Y - 5Y SX6YKrn , *LX*KA^ • " W 
W , = ^ f P | ...(10) 
where ALX, AKA are the shares of X and A in aggregate workforce and 
informal capital, that is, ALX = ^r a n c l ^KA = IT- |9|. \M a r e the factor intensity 
L K 
determinants in the informal segment. Clearly, the both should have the same 
sign. Therefore, |0|, |A| > 0. 8's are the cost shares of L, K and Y in X. 5X > 0 is 
the elasticity of factor substitution, between Kx and L in sector X. 8Y > 0 is the 
supply elasticity of Y, which shows the response in Ys due to a rise in PY when 
the resources supply in the informal segment is fixed. The impact of the release 
Wong (1995), pp. 34. 
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of additional labor from the formal sector is ignored here. Equation (9) shows the 
general equilibrium relation between PYe and Px. 
It is argued in this model that a fall in Px leads to a rise in W|, if and only if 
ALX « 0 (that is close to zero) and |9| < 0 or |A| < 0. 
If Y is capital intensive, |6| < 0 or |A| < 0. From equation (9), Px < 0 leads 
to PYe < 0 if |9| < 0. From equation (9), if ALX is close to zero, coefficient of fy is 
positive. If ALX > 0 and Y is capital intensive, i.e. |A| < 0, the sign of the coefficient 
of fy is unclear. For the stability purpose, the denominator of the coefficient in 
equation (9) must be positive. Therefore all action should be in numerator. 
If ALX = 0 and |0| < 0, |A| < 0, then a fall in Px leads to a fall in PYe and 
therefore a fall in W|. Therefore, if Y is labor intensive relative to A, W| falls due to 
a fall in Px. Also, if ALX = 0, and |A| < 0, (9LX + ^ p ) cannot be negative. 
Hence, the above general equilibrium exercise concludes that a fall in the 
price of the import competing formal sector due to a fall in tariff rate results in a 
rise in informal sector wages, if and only if the informal sector is capital intensive, 
the formal employment is negligible and most importantly, if capital is immobile 
between formal and informal sectors. 
Marjit (2003) developed the general equilibrium model, but did not provide 
any link with the Indian economy. A later study by Marjit and Maiti (2006) 
attempts to link the state-wise data on the growth of informal sector real fixed 
capital stock and the growth of informal sector real wage in India. This study 
argued that the results obtained from the above general equilibrium model is 
valid if the capital formation in the informal sector grows. 
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The current study as described in chapter 2 differs from Marjit (2003) in 
two places. First, informal sector, unlike Marjit, is considered not to be a single 
sector producing just the intermediate good. Instead, there are two informal 
sectors, both non-traded. One of them produces intermediate good for the formal 
import-competing sector and the other produces petty consumer goods and 
services. This is a much needed improvement, particularly relevant in Indian 
context where the petty consumer goods and services producing sector, i.e. the 
self-employed sector is the largest employment generating sector and it is 
growing (NCEUS, 2007, 2008). Second, capital is considered to be mobile 
between the formal and the informal sector. Given the variety of informal 
occupations in India, it is more realistic to differentiate a capital using informal 
sector producing intermediate goods from another informal sector that does not 
use capital.24 Also, it may not be the case that the formal sector wage is 
completely fixed at a given level, especially when the formal sector is facing 
international competition. 
1.6 Self-Employment Sector 
This section reviews the existing literature on the economy of the self-
employed sector. A number of studies focusing on the self-employed sector have 
already been discussed in earlier sections, particularly those considering the 
NCEUS (2007) and the NSSO reports on the unorganized sector show 
evidence of informal sector capital formation and its growth. 
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subcontracted and self-employed sector together. Yet, there are some studies 
solely on this sector, which require added attention. 
Self-employment sector is the biggest component of the informal sector in 
a number of developing countries. In India, about 258.3 million out of 422.6 
million people work as self-employed (NCEUS 2007). Conceptually, the self-
employment sector is quite a broad term, encompassing enormous variety of 
occupations and transactions. Most commonly, self-employment sector is meant 
to comprise of semi-independent peasants with small assets, petty commodity 
producers and traders, along with small family businesses (Harris-White, 2003). 
The dynamics of the economic activities in the self-employed sector include 
utilization of labor at various levels, such as family, religion, village, community or 
caste.25 Harris-White (2003) has used the novel idea of social structures of 
accumulation in understanding the dynamics of the informal sector. According to 
this idea, a major part of any developing economy is usually regulated by social 
structures that are resistant or immune to any change in policies of the state.26 
The idea of social structures of accumulation (SSA) emphasizes the extent of 
non-engagement between the state and a large part of its population. The latter 
depends more upon its ties with the social institutions than on the legal-
institutional structures put in place by the state. The social institutions include 
rules and regulations of family, religion, caste, community, village or town. The 
accumulations at each level of the social institutions have its own dynamics. For 
25
 Harris-White (2003), pp. 19. 
26
 Harris-White (2003), pp. 14-15. 
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example, gendered appropriation of income within the family, income generated 
and accumulated by the religious or caste majority, or, that by the majority 
determined by the power structure within a community. 
Most of the studies done on the self-employed sector of various countries 
have rightly acknowledged the entrepreneurial capacity and contribution of this 
sector. Keith Hart (1970), while coining the term Informal Sector, stressed upon 
the significance of the entrepreneurial contribution of the urban self-employed 
service-providing sector in Accra, Ghana. Hart also argued that the Western 
ethnocentric approach to economic studies often disregard the capability and 
contribution of the self-employed sector due to their preoccupation with the 
issues of 'firms' and 'businessmen'. Such studies tend to follow the definition of 
an 'entrepreneur' where a firm employs labor, uses other factors of production, 
produces goods and services, and sells them for profit. Any economic activity 
that does not seem to exactly follow this definition, are usually ignored and 
labeled as marginal and transient. Hart's study of the Ghanaian urban self-
employed sector laid out the significance of the self-employed entrepreneurs in 
livelihood generation for a large population. Hart provides a detailed discussion 
of who should be considered an 'entrepreneur'. Discussions on African 
economies, or for that matter, of Indian economy too, carry the underlying 
singularity of the idea of an entrepreneur, which is often ethnocentric in nature. 
The Ghanaian reporter who characterized this view of entrepreneur said the 
following: 
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...little reliance can be placed on the Ghanaian entrepreneur for 
rapid development...the Ghanaian businessman's attitude to 
growth is very different from the typical entrepreneur in the early 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England, for example. He 
remains, even when trading on a fairly large scale, in his approach 
essentially a petty trader. He is in business primarily to make 
money and to spend the money as he makes it on a higher 
standard of living and (somewhat unwillingly) in support of his 
numerous relations. No doubt a government firmly convinced of the 
virtues of private enterprise could encourage the capitalistic virtues 
in the course of time.27 
This approach has remained prevalent in much of the studies on the 
developing economies, and this has partly been responsible in the neglect of the 
self-employed capacity building. Clearly, the vagueness about the fate of the 
profit earned seemed to have reinforced this view that there can be only one kind 
of entrepreneur. In other words, the income earned by the self-employed 
entrepreneur is equated with the profit earned by the capitalist entrepreneur, and 
that has been expected to be reinvested in order for it to be taken seriously. The 
tremendous amount of diversification in the interest of the self-employed 
entrepreneur has contributed in the lack of understanding of this sector. The 
income earned in this sector is spent on maintaining the entrepreneur's familial 
responsibilities, as the above quote mentions, and it can also be spent on various 
other interests. Such interests, from the point of view of capitalist accumulation, 
are unproductive and therefore not to be incorporated in the study of economic 
development. This is justified by the ethnocentric idea of a homogeneous set of 
J. W. Williams (1963), pp. 196-97, quoted in Hart (1970), pp. 107. 
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prescriptions for curing underdevelopment, or, in other words, this is an 
ethnocentric view of development (Hart, 1970). 
The vagueness about the productiveness of the income earned in the self-
employed sector is not the only type to be seen, the production, consumption, 
investment and reproduction are interrelated with each other in much complexity. 
As a result a clear calculation of profit or net income seems impossible, 
according to Harris-White, (2009). It may be argued that an imputed wage 
analysis, where the income earned is considered as the sum of the wage 
(determined by the opportunity cost) and the rental payment for the equipments 
the self-employed worker uses. In that case, the net income may not be hard to 
find out. But differentiating between the value of opportunity cost and the rental 
payment turns out to be complicated. This is the point analyzed in chapter 3 of 
this research. 
Heterogeneity of the production processes has been another source of 
misunderstanding about this sector (Subrahmanya and Jhabvala, 2000). Harris-
White (2009) further emphasized the importance of social institutions in 
maintaining the economic behavior within the self-employed sector. The role of 
the social institutions such as gender, caste, religion or any such identity is often 
misunderstood due to the neglect of the co-existence of social and economic 
processes.28 Social institutions are the basis of the supply of factors of production 
in the self-employed sector, and they also influence income distribution and well-
Harris-White (2009), pp. 171. 
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being (Harris-White 2003, 2009; Jagannathan, 1987). Harris-White points out 
that the lack of understanding about the impacts the social institutions have in 
determining economic well-being leads to the failure of social policies in reaching 
the disenfranchised population.29 
Harris-White (2009) categorizes well-being of the self-employed workers 
using four features. Insecurity i.e. lacks of rights, poverty, risk and vulnerability 
and coercion are the four features of self-employed sector that determine the 
extent of well-being of the population working in this sector. Not all types of self-
employed occupations show all four of these features, but certain level of 
generalization proves to be effective in understanding the connection between 
work and well-being, according to Harris-White. 
Little or no property rights, rights to public goods and public services such 
as infrastructure, health, education, social security and sanitation tend to 
maintain certain level of insecurity within the self-employed sector. Poverty has 
shown to be entangled with the self-employment sector, as almost all poor 
people work in the self-employed sector (while the opposite may not necessarily 
be true). A majority of the self-employed population live a risky life with the threat 
of frequent diseases, death, old-age impairment and child and maternal mortality, 
all of which tend to have a positive relation with the economic productivity of the 
population. In other words, the poorer the population is, the riskier their lives are. 
The risk factor tends to be high in certain kinds of work the self-employed people 
29
 Harris-White (2009), pp. 172. The 'disenfranchised population' would entail the 
self-employed workers who live below or on the poverty line. 
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engage in. Dealing with hazardous material, low and dangerous quality inputs of 
production and machinery, irregular and long work hours and potentially risky 
way of work (for example, standing for excessively long hours, endearing the 
harsh weather, regularly carrying excess weight, engaging in repetitive 
movements etc) adds to the vulnerability of a majority of the self-employed 
population. Coercive ties to increasing debt, unpaid work, harassments at various 
levels (including sexual harassment, police harassments, public harassments 
etc) are also part and parcel of various occupations within the self-employed 
sector (Harris-White, 2009). 
Joseph Gaughan and Louis Ferman in their 1987 article on informal 
economy emphasized the role of noneconomic institutions in determining the 
economic performance of the informal self-employed sector. Gaughan and 
Ferman point out the diffused boundary between the personal, intimate spheres 
of family and community and the conventional economic sphere. While the 
advancement of industrial capitalist modes of production has overshadowed the 
important economic role of family and household, such kinship networks have 
proved to be much more durable and lasting over the history. Gaughan and 
Ferman (1987) highlighted the reason of the 'excess' population engaged in self-
employed activities to be the displacement of people from traditional agricultural 
work.30 The pressure from turning agricultural land in to grazing land, factories or 
increasing economic burden through higher rents or taxes have resulted in a 
This is another reason behind the rise in informal economic activities that 
studies like Marjit (2003) and Marjit and Maiti (2006) do not address. 
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mass displacement, the majority of which have been absorbed in the self-
employed sector. In the situations of mass out-migration from the traditional 
agricultural sector, Gaughan and Ferman identify the shortcomings of many 
developmental models drawn from the Western European or North American 
history. In this article, they counter the Western ethnocentric notion of unilinear 
development. According to them, it is important to recognize that many 
development models developed in the developed world 'do not apply' to places 
where industrial growth fail to match with the economic and demographic 
pressures.31 If the industrial capitalist modes of production are considered to be 
the only path for development, anything beyond the notion of 'atomized 
individual' making transactions in an impersonal marketplace is bound to be 
overlooked. The notion of kinship and community-based economic activities that 
are based on local cultural norms and the idea of reciprocal responsibilities of 
human beings should be considered as no less important, if one needs to 
understand the economy of the informal self-employed sector.32 
Marshall Sahlins' (1972) typology of reciprocities provides us the 
understanding of 'generalized reciprocity', 'balanced reciprocity', and 'negative 
reciprocity'. Although Sahlins applied these types in analyzing the old traditional 
societies, such typology becomes important to understand the modes of 
production in the self-employed sector. Gaughan and Ferman (1987) apply the 
31
 Gaughan and Ferman (1987), pp. 17-18. 
"Gaughan and Ferman (1987), pp. 18. 
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typology in explaining the influence of social institutions in determining well-being 
of the informal self-employed population. The putatively altruistic transactions like 
voluntary food sharing, the equivalent exchanges of materials between two 
economic agents, or the forms of appropriations aimed at maximizing utilitarian 
advantage even when the return is greater than what is offered, are the three 
forms of reciprocities that prevail in the self-employed economies. The degree of 
kinship bonding determines the type of reciprocity one engages in. For example, 
familial and residential groups depend primarily upon generalized reciprocities; 
village, tribe or similar larger communities rely on balanced reciprocities, and 
negative reciprocities are found in groups outside such known communities, 
where the economic agents are strangers to each other.33 
Gaughan and Ferman (1987) further stress the notion of 'economic work'. 
When the noneconomic institutions are to be given their due significance, the 
questions of what is work, value and profit require new understanding. The often 
non-cash exchanges within the self-employed economy challenges the 
compartmentalization of 'social' and 'economic' work. Moreover, if the community 
in question is well-integrated, the failure of one member is often resisted by the 
others, making the idea of competitive rational economic agent somewhat 
inapplicable. Gaughan and Ferman note, 
A well-integrated community resists allowing one of its own to fall 
into truly intolerable economic circumstances and will often send 
forth its own informal safety net. This is particularly observable in 
"Gaughan and Ferman (1987), pp. 19. 
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disadvantaged communities where very scarce resources must be 
shared in order to ensure the survival of the network.34 
In the question of illegal or criminal transactions, Gaughan and Ferman 
apply the concept of negative reciprocity. According to them, irregular activities 
are the extreme manifestation of negative reciprocities, such as dealing in legally 
forbidden goods, gambling, loan-sharking, prostitution etc. They point out that 
such activities fall into the fuzzy territory between criminal and the social and 
irregular economies. 
Although the differentiation between the outright criminal and the irregular 
activities may not seem compelling, the persistence of such activities along with 
other associational economic activities within the informal sphere of the economy 
requires further understanding. Conventional economic theory often falls short of 
explaining the dependence of more and more people on the informal self-
employed sector for livelihood parallel to the spread of the industrial capitalist 
modes of production in the formal sector. Gaughan and Ferman (1987) 
understand that, 
...it is reasonable to see this persistence as not simply a vestige of 
earlier modes, but rather as manifesting a spontaneous human 
disposition toward reciprocity and cooperation founded upon the 
means of biological and social reproduction.35 
34
 Gaughan and Ferman (1987), pp. 21. 
"Gaughan and Ferman (1987), pp. 23. 
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1.7 Conclusion 
This literature review provides important insights into the study of informal 
sector and traces out the contradictory understanding of the origin, definition and 
the measure of informal sector. It also summarizes the contemporary 
understanding of the well-being of the people working as informal labor, and 
points out that a clearer understanding is required. The literatures on the informal 
sector show that the economy of the self-employed sector is in need of a better 
assessment, through the recognition of the roles the social institutions play. The 
literature review demonstrates that it is not appropriate to conceptualize the 
informal sector as a mere substitute or compliment of the traditional economic 
activities, nor has it grown due to the failure of the traditional modes of 
production. Instead, the informal sector has been a crucial economic sphere for 
the maintenance of social life. It also shows that the conventional notion of 'firms' 
or 'businesses' prove to be inadequate in explaining the informal economic 
activities. A major goal of this literature review has been to create a space for the 
current research projects, namely, the modeling exercise on the impact of trade 
reforms on the informal sector wages and the demonstration of the economy of 
the self-employed sector. The next chapter develops a four-sector simple general 
equilibrium model to find out the theoretical rationale behind the nature of the 
change of informal sector wage in the post-trade reforms period. This model has 
been developed for a small open economy. The model has been built upon the 
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premise laid out by the earlier studies, particularly, the ones done by Marjit 
(2003). The model contributes to the literature by allowing one to understand the 
role trade reform policies play in changing the informal sector wage. The third 
chapter demonstrates the pattern of the economy of self-employed sector in a 
third world country. The roles of social institutions, which challenge the accepted 
categories of 'economic behavior', are evaluated in the study. This study bridges 
the gap between the anthropological, sociological and economic analyses of the 
self-employed economy, and thereby contributes to the understanding of the 
socially cohesive nature of 'work' and 'value of work'. By analyzing the socially 
embedded nature of 'economic development', this study improves our overall 
perception about development. It recognizes the significance of the noneconomic 
(such as the social, political and historical) aspects of a community life, in 
determining its economic capability and contribution to the people. If one is to 
understand the development processes and prospects of a community, such 
noneconomic aspects must be given their due importance. 
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CHAPTER 2 
TRADE REFORMS AND INDIAN INFORMAL SECTOR WAGES: A 
THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION 
2.1 Introduction 
Understanding responses of various sectors in an economy to liberalized 
trade has become increasingly important. The reason is that a number of the 
developing economies have been undertaking trade liberalization policies and 
various sectors of the economy have been going through adjustments and 
rearrangements. The economic performance of ah economy depends crucially 
upon the adjustments the sectors go through. A number of studies have 
demonstrated that the informal or unorganized sector of the majority of 
developing countries tends to grow in size as a reaction to trade reform policies 
(Yamada, 1996; Currie and Harrison, 1997; Goldberg and Pavcnik, 2003; Rouse, 
2004; Sinha and Harris-White, 2007; NCEUS, 2007). Contrary to the earlier 
understanding of the sector, the informal sector did not disappear through 
transferring labor to the formal sector. Instead, economists and social scientists 
have become convinced of the permanence of its existence (Castells and Portes, 
1989; De Soto, 1989; Breman, 1996; Fernandez-Kelly, 2006; Harris-White, 2002, 
2003, 2007). A new challenge for the researchers is to study the economic 
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prospects related to the sector. It is necessary to understand how the income of 
the population working in the informal sector is affected by the policies of trade 
reforms. This is because an increasing number of developing countries are 
adopting new economic policies promoting privatization, freer trade and financial 
as well as labor market liberalization. Despite its importance, the impact of trade 
reforms on the informal sector wages remains a mostly neglected matter. 
A contribution of this study is to fill this gap in the literature, by formulating 
a theoretical model, which examines how a falling tariff rate affects the wages in 
the informal sector. It builds partly upon the Marjit (2003) model, but shifts away 
from the specifications by making a novel distinction between the informal 
subcontracted sector and the informal self-employed sector and incorporating 
them into a simple general equilibrium model. Despite being the largest 
employment generating sector in a number of developing countries including 
India, the self-employed sector has never been incorporated into any prior 
economic study of the informal sector. Hence its inclusion into the model is an 
improvement over previously available studies. Such an improvement allows us 
to better understand the conditions and directions of trade liberalization policies' 
impact on the informal sector wages. 
The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 2.2 
develops the theoretical model. This model is built upon the simple general 
equilibrium models traditionally used in international trade. The next section 
describes and discusses all the assumptions. Section 2.3 develops and makes 
use of the comparative static analysis to find out the impact of decreasing trade 
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barrier on informal sector wage. Section 2.4 discusses the links between the 
falling tariff barrier and informal wage, as well as the implications of the results. 
Section 2.5 summarizes the analysis work and concludes by highlighting the 
contributions of this work. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework 
The economic model incorporating the informal sector has been 
formulated following the more common general equilibrium framework used by 
International trade theorists. Such simple general equilibrium models have been 
used for different purposes by Kar and Marjit (2001), Marjit and Beladi (2001). 
Marjit (2003) and Marjit and Maiti (2006) has made use of the similar framework 
for the same purpose of understanding the wage impact of trade reforms. The 
model generated in this work differs significantly from the previously used version 
in terms of its dimensions and other specifications, but the underlying 
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns technology has 
remained the common thread. The assumptions of perfectly competitive output 
markets and the constant returns to technology are crucial for this particular 
modeling exercise. The model in this study consists of four sectors producing 
four goods. There are four inputs used by the sectors. 
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(i) Sector X 
Sector X is the formal sector, producing a manufacturing good. This sector 
is the only import-competing sector in the economy. This sector produces output 
X following constant returns technology and operates in a perfectly competitive 
market.1 The production of output follows the production function as described 
below: 
X = fx(K,L,Y) (2.1) 
The production function summarizes the input-output relationship in sector 
X. Output X is produced using capital, labor and an intermediate good Y. Y is 
produced in the informal sector, which is described in the following subsection. 
The production function is assumed to be increasing, concave and linearly 
homogenous. It is differentiable up to the necessary order in inputs.2 
The firm sells its output at price Px. Capital is paid according to the value 
of its marginal product. The rental rate of capital is r and Y is paid its per unit 
price PY. The value of labor is determined in a slightly different way. Labor is 
hired until the point where the value of the marginal product of labor equals the 
1
 The assumption of perfect competition has often faced criticism from a number 
of economists, particularly those who are skeptical about the neoclassical 
economic modeling. For example, the import-substituting industries of the mid to 
late 20th century in the developing part of the world were oligopolistic. This 
research considers perfect competition for the sake of convenience and 
simplicity. 
2
 The specific form of the production function would be similar to a Leontief 
function. 
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institutionally determined wage WF.3 This implies a restriction on the labor 
employment in this sector; thereby a higher capital-labor ratio is present in this 
sector (higher than what it would have been in the presence of a competitively 
determined wage instead of an institutionally determined wage). The institutional 
determination of the wage in this sector could be due to the presence of labor 
unions, minimum wage law, public sector pay policies or any other reason.4 No 
differentiation among labor types is assumed in this model. As a result, those 
who can find work in sector X, get paid a wage that is higher than that is of other 
sectors, without being qualitatively different from workers working in those other 
sectors. In other words, labor is imperfectly mobile between sector X and the rest 
of the economy. 
Since this is the import competing sector, the domestic market supply of X 
is shared by the domestic producers of X and the imports of X. Thus the 
demand-supply balance follows the relationship as stated below: 
Xd (Px) = Xs (Px) = X' + X,M (2.2) 
3
 The institutionally determined wage in the modern (formal) sector is considered 
in Harris and Todaro (1970), where the workers are paid according to their value 
of marginal product until the point where the marginal product is equal to the 
politically determined minimum urban wage. This implies the existence of 
unemployment in the urban sector. But in the model formulated in this research 
there exists free entry of labor into the informal sectors, which in effect absorbs 
those whoever wants to work. 
4
 For example, some larger Indian firms are not allowed to lay off workers, 
resulting in low employment and economic efficiency level (Besley and Burgess, 
2004). Also, the resolutions of the Indian trade unions (which are almost always 
affiliated with the political parties) indicate the similar restrictions. 
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where X' is the domestically produced output and X|M is the amount of X 
imported. It is assumed that a Px > 0 exists for which the market clears. The price 
Px is determined internationally, implying that the economy in question is a small 
open economy. 
The usual economic implication of cost-minimization is assumed here, 
hence there is the scope of substitution between the inputs if any of the inputs 
become relatively expensive to the firm. This is not applicable to the intermediate 
good Y. The assumption here is that there is zero substitutability between capital 
and the intermediate good, or between labor and the intermediate good. Thus, a 
fixed amount of the intermediate good is essential for the production of each unit 
of output X. The assumption of zero substitutability between the intermediate 
good and other inputs is a simplifying but not an unrealistic assumption. For 
example, if sector X is assumed to be an industry such that it subcontracts sector 
Y to produce items like shoes, apparels or processed food items and labels and 
markets the good as a final product, then a fixed proportional use of the 
intermediate good (i.e. those items produced by sector Y) is possible. This 
analogy can include various different types of good. 
The unit cost function for the firm is as the following: 
Cx(WF, r, PY) = min [aLxWF+a,<xr: Fx(aLx, 3KX) 2:1] (2.3) 
ai_x, SKX 
The solution values of ai_x and ai<x are the cost-minimizing unit factor 
requirements for sector X. Since production of output in this sector takes place 
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under the condition of perfect competition, the price of the output will be equal to 
the unit costs of the inputs. This implication generates the following relationship: 
aLxWF + a^ r + aYxPv = Px (2.4') 
Without the loss of generality, ayx = 1 is assumed, so that the above 
relationship can be re-written as, 
aLxWF+aKxr+PY = Px (2.4) 
Since this is the import-competing sector, a fall in the tariff rate will be 
reflected through the price of this sector. Thus equation 2.3 can be rewritten as 
follows: 
aLxWF+aKxr + aYxPY=Px* + t = Px (2.5) 
where t denotes the per-unit tariff imposed on the imported part of the 
output X. this is the sector that first captures any change in the tariff rate. 
Therefore, a trade liberalization policy will result in a fall in the price of output X. 
(ii) Sector Y 
This is a non-traded informal sector, producing the intermediate good Y. It 
is subcontracted by the formal manufacturing sector for the supply of 
intermediate good Y. It operates under constant returns technology and in a 
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perfectly competitive market. The production takes place following the production 
function: 
Y = fY(K,L) (2.6) 
The above production function is increasing, concave, linearly homogenous 
and differentiable up to the necessary order in inputs, according to the 
assumption. The price of output, as indicated previously, is PY. The values of the 
marginal product of the inputs determine the payments. Since this is the informal 
sector and there exists free entry, the labor working in this sector receives the 
competitive informal wage, W|, where W|< WF, by assumption. 
The entire output of Y is sold to the formal manufacturing sector X as an 
intermediate commodity. Therefore, a change in the size of the output in sector X 
impacts Y directly. The demand-supply balance in sector Y follows the 
relationship as stated below: 
Y = Yd = Ys = aYXX = X (2.7) 
Any arbitrary price of Y may lead to excesses in the Y market. In order for 
equation 2.6 to hold, E(PY) = (Yd - Ys) = 0 is required. This is assumed to take 
place for PY and that a PY > 0 exists. 
The cost minimization condition implies substitutability between capital 
and labor in this sector. The unit cost function looks like the following: 
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CY(W|, r)= min [aLYW|+aKYr: FY(aLY, aKY) ^1] (2.8) 
ai_Y, SK Y 
The cost minimizing unit factor requirements are obtained as aLY, aKY. 
Perfectly competitive market generates the equality between the costs of inputs 
and price of the output. This gives the following relationship: 
aLYW,+ aKYr= PY (2.9) 
In this study, contrary to the considerations of earlier studies, sector Y is 
not the only informal sector. This study takes into account the other, usually 
neglected part of the informal sector, the self-employed sector. Incorporation of 
the self-employed sector as a separate independent sector is crucial, given its 
vast size and the difference with sector Y, i.e. the informal subcontracted sector. 
(iii) Sector S 
Sector S is the informal self-employed sector, producing output S, a 
combination of petty consumer goods and services. The consumer goods and 
services produced with meager input and sold at a lower price is often termed as 
petty consumer goods and services (Hart 1973, Breman 1996, Harris-White 
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2002, Power 2006). The usual assumption of constant returns to scale 
technology and a perfectly competitive market is also used here.5 The inputs and 
output have the usual relationship according to the following production function: 
S = fs(L,C) (2.10) 
where C denotes social capital. The reason behind using a social capital is 
the meager amount of various other types of capital used in this sector and the 
difficulty of conceiving the rental rates of each types of capital. For example, a 
street food vendor produces her/his product using own/family labor and a mix of 
different other inputs including the utensils, the ingredients, the fuel, the cooking 
space etc. all of which could either be bought or rented with or without the 
assistance of family or community. Again, a maid-servant sells her service which 
includes labor, transportation, community network as social capital etc. The 
difference between various types of capital can be ambiguous. Moreover, 
calculating the little amounts of capital used by the workers in this sector poses a 
technical challenge (Jellineck, 1997; Harris-White, 2002; Power, 2006). It is more 
appropriate to use social capital that determines the availability of all the inputs of 
production, however small in amount it is. A well-networked or socially well-
connected (with the neighborhood, village, town or language-religion-caste 
groups) worker is assumed to have the access to the various other capitals and 
5
 The assumption of perfect competition is assumed here for the purpose of 
convenience and simplicity. Chapter 3 of this research examines the impact of 
the relaxation of this assumption. 
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equipment required to engage in the production process. It lends clarity to the 
study without taking any significant insights away. 
The price of output S is considered as Ps. The output S is consumed 
domestically, as this is a non-tradable sector. A particular value of Ps' >0 is 
assumed to exist for which the market for the consumption goods produced by 
the self-employed sector clears. The demand-supply balance is given as: 
Es(Ps) = Sd (Ps) - Ss (Ps) = 0 (2.11) 
for Ps> 0. 
The inputs of production are paid according to the value of their marginal 
product. The implications and limitations of this assumption are discussed in 
chapter 3. Detailed analysis of the relaxation of this assumption is included there 
too. The labor working in this sector is essentially informal, earning the informal 
wage W| (this can be considered as some imputed wage). The rental rate of the 
social capital is rc. Substitutability between labor and the social capital implies 
the following unit cost function: 
Cs(Wi, r c )= min [aLS W, + a c s rc : Fs(aLS, aCs) ^1] (2.12) 
SLS, acs 
SLS, acs are the cost minimizing unit input requirement in this sector. The 
assumption of perfect competition provides the following equality between the 
factor costs and the price of the output: 
aLsW| + aCsrc = Ps (2.13) 
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(iv) Sector A 
The fourth sector of the model economy of this study is the agricultural 
sector producing output A. It is the export sector, producing agricultural 
commodities using labor, capital and land6. The assumptions of constant 
returns technology and perfect competition are applied in this sector as well. 
The production follows the following functional relationship: 
A = fA(L, K,T) (2.14) 
where T stands for land input. This production function, similar to the 
productions functions of the other three sectors, is assumed to be increasing, 
concave, linearly homogenous and differentiable up to the necessary order in 
inputs. Since this is the export sector, the total produce of A is divided among 
the domestic and the world market. The demand-supply balance is obtained 
for a positive price PA> 0: 
Ad + AEx = As (2.15) 
6
 The agricultural trade data available from the Indian Ministry of Agriculture 
annual reports show that the agricultural export is substantial, both in terms of 
volume and money value, although the composition of agricultural export has 
changed to become predominantly cash crops. 
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where Ad and AEx are sold in the domestic and international markets, 
respectively, and As is the supply of the agricultural products. 
For PA = PA> 0, 
EA(PA) = A d (P A ) -A s (P A ) = 0 (2.16) 
The rental rate of land is denoted by R. The labor working in the 
agricultural sector is predominantly informal, hence the wage rate in this sector is 
W|. Substitutability between the inputs land and labor is reflected by the unit cost 
function: 
CA(W|, R) = min [aLA\A/|+ aTAR + aKA r: FA(aLA, aKA, aTA) *1] (2.17) 
ai_A, a ^ , a jA 
where ai_A, a«A, aTA denote the cost minimizing unit factor requirements of 
this sector. The price setting equation is obtained as follows, under the 
assumption of a perfectly competitive market: 
aLAW|+aKAr + aTAR = PA (2.18) 
Hence, equations 2.5, 2.9, 2.14 and 2.19 generate the following price 
system: 
aLxWF + aKxr + aYxPY = Px* + t = Px (2.5) 
aLYW|+aK Yr= PY (2.9) 
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aLsW| + aCsrc = Ps (2.13) 
aLAW| + aKAr + aTAR = PA (2.18) 
A crucial assumption in the work is of full employment. The input markets 
are assumed always to be cleared completely; in other words, there is no open 
unemployment in the economy. The existence of full employment can be 
expressed by the following functional relationships: 
aKxX + aKYY + aKAA = K (2.19) 
ai_xX + aLY Y + aLsS + ai_AA = L (2.20) 
ac sS = C (2.21) 
aTAA = T (2.22) 
The above equations reflect that the sums of the cost minimizing derived 
demand for the inputs are equal to the respective stock of inputs available in the 
economy. Constant returns to scale technology and inter-sectoral factor mobility 
are the two important assumptions underlying the existence of the full 
employment conditions. It is to be remembered here that labor is not perfectly 
mobile between sector X and the rest of the economy. However, workers who 
cannot get absorbed in the formal manufacturing sector are assumed to move 
into the informal sectors. All those workers are assumed to get absorbed into the 
informal sectors, leading to the clearing of the labor market. 
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Another important assumption is about the relative factor intensities of the 
sectors. The formal manufacturing sector is expectedly a more capital intensive 
sector, than the subcontracted informal sector. Again, the informal subcontracted 
sector is assumed to be more capital intensive than the agricultural sector. The 
self-employed sector is labor intensive. This is in line with the majority of the self-
employed works undertaken in India, which is usually labor intensive. The points 
of interest here are the following: 
Kx/Lx > Ky/Lv > KA/LA. 
The general equilibrium model formulated above can now be determined 
as follows. The point of entry can be the tariff rate, which is given by government 
policy. Given t, the price equations can determine the factor prices W,, r, rc and 
R. Formal wage WF is institutionally determined. The factor coefficients are 
determined from the price system. Then, equation 2.21 determines S and 2.22 
determines A. Similarly, X and Y are determined from equations 2.19 and 2.20. 
Hence, the entire model is determined in this way. 
The next section presents the comparative static analysis and its 
implications. For the sake of convenience, the agricultural commodity can be 
considered as the numeraire, since the economy concerned is a small open 
economy. Hence, the price PA = 1 • Also, the prices of the petty consumer goods 
and services do not change much, therefore is assumed to remain largely fixed. 
This is particularly true if we consider the urban self-employed workers, such as 
the street vendors, hawkers, maid-servants, recyclers as parts of this sector. 
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Their earnings do not change easily. These assumptions help to find the link(s). 
between a declining tariff rate and informal sector wage. 
2.3 Modeling the Links between Trade Reforms and Informal Sector Wages 
A comparative static analysis is undertaken, in order to understand the 
impact of falling trade barriers. Trade liberalization policies are reflected through 
a fall in the exogenous tariff rate, t. Since the price of the formal import-
competing sector was protected by the tariff, a liberalized trade regime results in 
a fall in Px. 
(i) The Price System 
Total differentiation of equations 2.5, 2.9, 2.13 and 2.18, collecting terms and the 
use of envelope theorem give the following set of equations: 
w F e L X + feK X = PX - eLXpY 
w;eL Y + feK Y = fY 
w;e L S + r^eCs = PS 
wjeL A + fe K A + ReT A = f£ 
factor pricejajj 
where % = — = share of factor j in sector i. 
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The formal sector wage has been assumed to be institutionally given as 
WF. Hence Wp = 0. Using Cramer's rule, the factor prices can be solved from the 
above set of equations. 
Wi = -^[(Px-eYxPY)eKYecseTA + PYeKxecseTA] (2.23) 
f = -jij[(Px-eYxPY)eLYecseTA] •, (2.24) 
^c = — ]£]• [^KX^LY^TAPS — (px — 9YXPY)9KY6CS9TA] (2-25) 
R = — jm [^KX^LY^CSPA + QKX^LA^CSPY — (Px — 9YXPY)9LY6CS8KA] (2.26) 
where |9|= - 0KX 0Ly ^cs 6TA- Since the formal manufacturing sector is 
capital intensive, |9| < 0. 
(ii) The Full Employment Conditions: 
Similar to the price system, the full employment conditions are 
differentiated totally, and after collecting terms and using envelope theorem, the 
following set of equations are obtained: 
AKXX + AKYY + AKAA = K — (ARX^X + K^Ya1<Y + AKA31<A) (2-27) 
ALXX + ALYY + ALSS + ALAA = L - (ALXa[x + ALY^LY + ALsa?;s + ALASQ) (2.28) 
ACSS = C - Ac sa? s (2.29) 
ATAA = T - ATAa?A (2.30) 
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where A^  = ^  = fraction of factor j employed in sector i. 
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Because of the zero substitutability between labor and the intermediate 
good, or between capital and the intermediate good, 
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The elasticities of substitution are used to solve for the change in the unit 
factor requirements, a^A from the cost minimization conditions: 
QLX&TX + 9KX<*KX + QYX<*YX = 0 
@LYaLY + VKYaKY = 0 
QLA&LS + QcsOcs = 0 
@LAaLA + ^KAaKA + @TAaTA ~ 0 
The above conditions are obtained using the envelope theorem from the 
first order conditions of cost minimization. 
76 
Equations 2.27 - 2.30 now can be rewritten as follows: 
•x v + > v - t ? r a gxeL Xf • gYBLY(Wi-f) g f e ^ C w ! - ? ) 
AKXA + AKYY - K - L-AKX7^—To—T + AKY"TS—ITS—T" ~ AKA —75—T~^—\~i 
ALXX + ALYY + ALSS + ALAA ^ ^ 
= L - r-A g x 9 i « f _ A ^YQKYCWI - r) <Tsecs(r^ - W t) 
(9LX + 0Kx) (0LY + 9KY) (0CS + 9LS) 
+ A ^
L 9 K A ( W i - f ) 
(0LA + 9TA) 
A c s b - L + A c s — — 
(.ocs + °LSJ 
- - <JAT0KA(? - R) 
ATAA - T - ATA — — — — — 
KPKA + °TAJ 
Cramer's rule is used to solve the above system of equations for X, Y, S, A. 
The expressions are as follows: 
A CS A TA[ — f ( A LY A KX a KX + ALXAKYaLx) - (Wi — f)(ALYACSaCS — ALYAKAaKA 
+ALYACSaLS + ALAAKYaLA) ~ (^C — W i ) ( A L S A K Y a L S + ALSAKY0Ccs) 
—(f - Rj(ALAAKYaTA + ALYAKAaTA)] X = 
(2.31) 
Y 
ACSATA[?(ALXAKX aLX + ALXAKXaKx) — ( W I — f)(AKYALXaKY - AKXALAaLA — AKAALXaKA) 




s _ ATA(AKXALY ~ ^LX^KY)[C ~ aLs(rc - Wj)] 
|A| 
(2.33) 
x = AC S(AKXALY-AL XAKY)[T - «LA(W, - R)] 
|A| 
(2.34) 
where |A| =ACSATA( AKYALX - AKXALY) 
aLX = ^X^LX^X 
aKX = aX0KX$X 
aKY = CTY0KY5Y 
aLY = OY&VY&Y 
aTA - aA °KA°A 
™ _ „KL f l CKL aLA — aA °KAdA 
™ _ -KLn cKL 
aKA — a A °LA6A 
aCS — ^S^CS^S 
aLS = ^S^LS^s 
1 
5X = 
(9LX + 9KX) 
1 
6Y = (9LY + 8KY) 
1 
(0CS + 9LS) 
§KL _ 
(9L A + 8]^) 
78 
§KT _ 
(0TA + 9KA) 
Now the expressions for the factor prices obtained as equations 2.23, 
2.24, 2.25 and 2.26 are used to find the following expressions for X and Y. Also, 
according to the assumptions of this model, the agricultural good is the 
numeraire good, and the price of the self-employed good takes longer than the 
prices of the other goods to change. Therefore, P^  = 0 and Ps = 0. 
_ 1 
X = T T 7 7 7 T ^ C S ^ T A I ( 9 K Y + 9 L Y ) ( ^ K A ^ L Y ( X K A — ACSALYaCS — ACSALYaCS — AKYALSaLS 
— AKYALAaLA — AKYALS aCs)(Px — ^ L Y P Y ) — PY(—AKYALYaKY 
+ ^KA^LY^KA + AKYALYaLY — AKYALSaLS — AKYALAaLA — AKYALSaCS 
+ AKYALAaTA ~~ AKAALYaTA)0KxJ 
(2.35) 
1 
Ij, |iorACSATA[(QKY + 6LY)(AKYALAaLA — AKYALAaKY — AKAALXaKA)(Px — ^ L Y ^ Y ) 
+ Py(AKXALYaLS — AKXALAaLA — AKXALSaCS + AKXALAaTA — AKXALXaKX 
+ AKAALXaKA + AKAALXaTA)6KxJ 
(2.36) 
From equation 2.7, the demand-supply balance in sector Y has been 
obtained as follows: 
Y = Yd = Ys = ayxX 
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Differentiating totally and rearranging terms the following expression can 
be derived: 
Yd = Ys 
Using this relationship, equations 2.35 and 2.36 can be interpreted as 
follows: 
~ 1 ~ ~ 
=
 TTTTHT ^CS^TA L^ ®KY + 6LY)(^KY^LAaLA — AKYALAaKY — AKAALXaKA)(Px — Q L Y P Y ) 
+ PY(AKXALYaLS — AKXALAaLA ~ AKXALSaCS + AKXALAaTA ~~ AKXALXaKX 
+ AKAALXaKA + AKAALXaTA)6KxJ 
(2.37) 
Yd — ^ — I I | | Q | A C S A T A [ ( 0 K Y + 0LY)(AKAALYaKA ~~ ACSALYaCS — ACSALYaCS 
— AKYALSaLS — AKYALAaLA — AKYALSaCs)(Px — ^ L Y P Y ) — PY(— AKYALYaKY 
+ AKAALY«KA + AKYALYaLY — AKYALSaLS — AKYALAaLA — AKYALSaCS 
+ AKYALAaTA — AKAALYaTA)0RxJ 
(2.38) 
Therefore, the relationship between Ys and Y^ generates the following: 
PY 
P X ( 6 K Y + 9LY)(AKYALAgA ~ AKAALYgA ~ ALYACSqS + AKYALSgs) 
Q R X C ^ K X ^ L A ^ A + AKAALXaA + AKAALYaA + AKYALAaA + ALYAKYaS + ALYAKYaY — ^LS^KY^s) 
(2.39) 
Finally, plugging the expression obtained above into equation 2.24, the 
expression for the informal sector wage is reached, 
rzT ^ Q o rr P^KX^KYV + (QLY^KY + 9KX)(6KY + QLY)^, 




<P - ^-KX^LA^A + ^KA^LXaA + ^KA^-LY^A + AKY^LA0A + ALYAKY<JS + ALYAKY(TY 
^LSAKYaS 
And \\i = AKYALAaA - A ^ A ^ c ^ - ALYAcsas + AKYALSas 
Further simplification gives, 
^ 1 v^cs^TA v\ 
Wj = Px T Q T " Q — ~ [6KX9KY<P + (QLY^KY + 6KX)(6RY + ^LYM^A (^LAAKY — ARAALY)} 
— CTS(ALYACS ~~ ^ K Y \ S ) ] 
.(2.41) 
The stability condition for the market of Y is, 
d ( Y d - Y s ) 
dPY 
This implies that Yd = Ys around equilibrium. Therefore, 




From equations 2.35 and 2.36 are differentiated with respect to PY and then the 
growth rate expressions (-=!• and ^ ) are obtained, which is <p. Therefore, equation 
Py Py 
2.43 implies that the denominator of equation 2.39 is negative. 
Again, |0| is defined as negative, since the formal manufacturing sector is capital 
intensive. 
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Hence the sign of Wj depends upon the signs of numerator. 
2.4 Discussion 
In this section, the following two propositions demonstrate the two 
possible outcomes of the above modeling exercise. In order to derive the 
outcomes, equation 2.41 can be rewritten as the following, 
W i = Px77n~5—7T [6KX6KY<P + (6LY©KY + GRXX^KY + 9LY)[[^A (^LA^KY - ^KA^LY); 
l°l °KX<P 
+ (as(^LS^-KY — \Y^CS)}] 
(2.44) 
Proposition I : A fall in Px due to falling tariff, t, may lead to Wj < 0 if the 
following is true: 
The ratio of the fractions of labor and social capital employed in the self-
employed sector is greater than the ratio of the fractions of labor and capital 
employed in the informal subcontracted sector. 
The formal manufacturing sector is more capital intensive than the 
informal subcontracted sector, for which JT7<0. The stability condition 2.43 implies 
that cp<0. The share of social capital in the self-employed sector, the share of 
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land in the agricultural sector, the share of capital in the formal manufacturing 
sector and the informal subcontracted sector and the share of labor in the 
informal subcontracted sector are all positive. The elasticity of substitution 
between labor and social capital in the self-employed sector and that between 
capital and labor in the agricultural sector are both positive. Hence, W, < 0 if and 
only if (ALAAKY - AKAALY) >0 and (ALSAKY - ALYAcs)>0. In other words, a 
decreasing informal sector wage requires that, — > - ^ and - ^ > —. 
This proposition can intuitively be explained as the following. The 
decrease in tariff rate due to the trade liberalization policies lead to a contraction 
of the formal manufacturing sector, which is the import-competing sector. As a 
result, labor is released from this sector, a section of who enter the self-employed 
sector. The agricultural sector may also absorb a section of the labor released 
from the formal sector. This also leads to the release of capital from the formal 
sector, which can end up in the agricultural sector. The data on the gross capital 
formation in the agricultural sector in India supports this.7 The relative labor 
intensity of the agricultural sector compared to the informal subcontracted sector 
results in ^ > ^ . 
*KA ^KY 
On the other hand, the significant extent of internal displacement of people 
in India leads to a decline in the employment of social capital in the self-
employed sector. This takes place through buying and/or leasing the natural 
resources, such as land, water, forest, and mines etc. resulting in significant 
7
 Appendix C contains the data. 
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dispossession of the people depending upon the resources for their subsistence. 
This gives rise to an influx of self-employed workers, both in the rural and in the 
urban areas. The extent of internal displacement in India is significant, especially 
in the period after 1991, the year when the trade liberalization policies were 
adopted. The special economic zones, export processing zones as well as big 
industrial projects have led to mass exodus from the areas where local people 
had established networks to access social capital. As a result, the self-employed 
sector can be understood as the sector that employs more labor compared to 
social capital.8 
Again, employment data on the informal sector clearly shows (NCEUS 
2007) that more labor is employed in the self-employed sector than the informal 
subcontracted sector. Hence the following situations arise: 
The labor employment in the self-employed sector grows; the social 
capital employment in the self-employment sector falls; the labor employment in 
the informal subcontracted sector grows but less than that in the self-employed 
sector; and, capital employment in the informal subcontracted sector grows. It 
can be concluded that the ratio of the labor and social capital employment in the 
self-employed sector is greater than the ratio of labor and capital employment in 
the informal subcontracted sector. In other words, - ^ > - ^ 
The intuition behind the above analysis can be summarized as the 
following: 
8
 Reports of the Indian Population Council, the Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Center state that Also, evictions due to large factories and various special 
economic enclosures are frequent. 
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The declining price of the import-competing manufacturing sector due to 
the declining tariff decreases the labor employment in this sector and more labor 
is absorbed in the agricultural and self-employed sector. Along with labor, the 
formal manufacturing sector releases capital as well, which end up in the 
agricultural sector. The newly absorbed labor force in the self-employed sector 
faces a reduction in the access to the social capital due to the growing 
dispossession of the resources and social network. Such dispossession can 
result from the rearrangement of property rights by the formal import-competing 
manufacturing sector, which buys/leases resources as an alternative method of 
reducing cost of production (the first one being the contraction in the formal 
workforce). Thus, the labor employment in the self-employed sector grows as the 
social capital dwindles. On the other hand, the labor employment in the informal 
subcontracted sector is lower than that in the self-employed sector. As a result, 
the ratio of the labor and social capital employment in the self-employed sector is 
greater than the ratio of labor and capital employment in the informal 
subcontracted sector, i.e., - ^ > - ^ is possible. 
Proposition II : A fall in Px due to falling tariff, t, may lead to W, > 0 if the 
following is true: 
The ratio of the fractions of labor and social capital employed in the self-
employed sector is less than the ratio of the fractions of labor and capital 
employed in the informal subcontracted sector. 
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In other words, the trade liberalization policy may lead to a rise in informal 
sector wage iff - ^ < -^-. This is possible only when one the following two 
conditions are met. First, the employment of social capital falls below that of labor 
in the self-employed sector because the social or community ties are stronger. 
This may stem from a lower rate of out-migration from the villages or the states. 
The second condition is that the share of labor employment is higher in the 
subcontracted sector than that in the self-employed sector. The first condition 
can be examined using the available migration date from India. The latest 
population census data of India (2001) shows that the rural out-migration, both 
inter and intra-state are comparable and has not decreased over the previous 
periods (UNDP urban Poverty report 2009, Mitra and Murayama 2008, National 
Population Commission of India reports). Therefore it is tough to find intuitive 
support in favor of a lower employment of labor compared to that of the social 
capital in the self-employed sector. Moreover, the internal displacement data, as 
discussed above, contradicts this condition. Again, the employment data 
obtained from the NCEUS (2007) report does not support the second condition. 
Therefore it is hard to find logical or data support for proposition II. 
Both the propositions demonstrate the significance of the self-employed 
sector in determining the informal sector wage. The outcome of the modeling 
exercise done in the previous section is clearly dependent upon the employment 
of labor in the self-employed sector (along with that in the subcontracted sector) 
and also, on the employment of social capital in the self-employed sector. This 
intriguing result is relevant from the policy perspective. Since the vast self-
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employed sector holds a crucial key to the improvement of the working 
conditions, precisely the wages of the informal workers, there is ample scope for 
the policymakers to rethink development policies for the self-employed sector. 
2.5 Conclusion 
India, like a lot of other developing countries, has started implementing 
liberalization policies in the early 1990s. Since the liberalization policies 
influenced the Indian economy very much, it is very important to understand the 
adjustments different sectors undergoes and the costs associated with the 
adjustments. The goal of this research was to understand how the wages of the 
informal sector adjusts in response to the trade liberalization policies. This 
chapter has generated a four-sector simple general equilibrium model, where 
there are two types of informal sector, the informal subcontracted sector and the 
informal self-employed sector, along with the formal manufacturing sector and 
the agricultural sector. Unlike the previous economic studies, this research gives 
both types of informal sector their due importance in a neoclassical modeling 
exercise. The trade liberalization policies are represented by a fall in the tariff 
rate and therefore a fall in the price of the import competing manufacturing 
sector. The expression for the change in informal sector wage is obtained by 
solving the price system and the full employment system with the use of 
Cramer's rule and envelope theorem. The resultant expression for informal 
sector wage indicates the importance of the self-employment sector. Despite 
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certain level of subjectivity, the result shows that a fall in the tariff rate (reflected 
through the falling price of the import-competing formal manufacturing sector) 
can lead to a fall in the informal sector wage, if the fraction of labor employed in 
the self-employed sector compared to that of social capital in this sector is 
greater than the fraction of labor employed compared to capital in the informal 
subcontracted sector. Incorporating the self-employed sector as a sector 
separate from the informal subcontracted sector is an original contribution of this 
chapter. It allows one to understand the role of the self-employed sector in 
affecting the working condition of the workers in both types of informal sectors. 
This is the fundamental way in which this research parts ways with the previous 
studies in informal sector. This is the first ever economic research where the self-
employed sector has been considered as a separate and independent sector, 
and through the general equilibrium modeling exercise, this research emphasizes 
the requirement for a better understanding of the self-employed sector. The next 




THE ECONOMY OF THE SELF-EMPLOYMENT SECTOR 
3.1 Introduction 
People working as self-employed in the developing countries are often 
considered as poor and property-less individuals, and therefore their method of 
production are left out of the economic analysis of wealth generation. Self-
employed sector comprises of about 258.3 million people in India (NCEUS 2007). 
All of the semi-independent peasants with small assets, the petty commodity 
producers and traders, the small family businesses and various kinds of mobile 
exchange and productions constitute the self-employed sector. It is crucial to 
understand the internal dynamics of the economy of the self-employed sector 
from more than one perspective. No understanding of economic development 
can be complete without the due attention to the self-employed sector, 
particularly because of its enormous size and capacity to provide for a huge 
proportion of the population. In the aftermath of the implementation of the trade 
liberalization policies in India, i.e. post-1991, the increasing size of the self-
employed sector makes its understanding even more important. Among other 
factors leading to the growth of self-employed sector such as the internal 
displacement of people due to industrialization and rearrangement of property 
rights and rural-urban migration, the trade liberalization policies of 1991 is an 
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important one. Therefore, the economy of the self-employed sector requires 
attention from the policymakers' point of view as well. As the previous chapter 
demonstrated, the working condition of the casualized workers of the Indian 
economy is affected by the economic conditions of the self-employed sector. A 
clearer perception of the majority of Indian working population necessitates a 
better understanding of the economy of the self-employed sector. 
A majority of the literature on development economics addressing the 
permanence of the growing informal economy of the developing nations 
concentrates on the dynamics of the informal subcontracted sector. The informal 
subcontracted sector employs casual wage workers to produce the goods and 
services outsourced by the formal sector. But, a larger portion of the informal 
population is self-employed, and the analyses of the informal sector as well as of 
the formal-informal interactions are bound to be insufficient unless this self-
employed population receives attention. This chapter fills the gap by analyzing 
the production system of the self-employed sector. Since the trade liberalization 
policies and their impact on Indian economy gives us the opportunity of a 'natural 
experiment', this chapter draws primarily on the Indian self-employed sector. In 
this sense, the study of the self-employed sector provided in this chapter 
considers India as a case in point. But the understanding generated here may be 
checked whether it is general enough to be applied in the study of the self-
employed sectors of other similar economies.1 
1
 It may appear to be quite ambiguous to list the similar economies, where the 
current study of the Indian self-employed sector can be applied. There can be 
various ways to find similarity between two economies. The specific features that 
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The rest of the chapter is organized in the following manner. Section 3.2 
presents a cross-sectional view of the self-employed occupations available in 
India. This section also explains the methods of categorizations of the 
occupations. Section 3.3.1 examines the major characteristics of the production 
processes of self-employed occupations and the method of valuing the inputs. 
The next section, 3.3.2 examines the costs of production in the self-employed 
sector. The transfer income earned from various sources including the 
government welfare programs is important for the survival of the self-employed 
population, which has been described in section 3.3.3. Section 3.4 strongly 
argues the non-viability of an optimization exercise for the self-employed sector. 
Section 3.5 demonstrates the role of the self-employed sector in defying the 
much celebrated model of dual economy. A summary of the chapter along with 
some concluding comments follow in section 3.6. 
3.2 Self-employed Occupations 
According to some researchers, the heterogeneity of the production processes 
belonging to the self-employed sector leads to the lack of understanding about 
this sector (Subrahmanya and Jhabvala, 2000, Harris-White, 2009). For a lot of 
might help one to consider two economies similar, especially for the current 
purpose, should include the historical experience of colonialism, geographical 
features that influence occupational patters, ratio of population to resources, 
process of community building according to neighborhood, village/town, religion, 
caste etc. In other words, any economic and non-economic factor that might 
influence the production patterns. Of course this list of features here is no way 
exhaustive. 
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other economists, it is the non-conformism of the self-employed occupations with 
the definition of the capitalist entrepreneur that results in the misunderstanding of 
this sector (Hart 1970). The goal of this subsection is to disentangle the self-
employed occupations from a web of confusion about their merit of being 
entrepreneurs. It explores the definitions of the very words such as 'work' and 
'entrepreneur'. 
The dictionary definition of the word 'work' says that it is an activity of 
exerting physical and/or mental effort to do or perform something. A more 
specific definition of work that is acceptable in Economics would be, "the labor, 
task, or duty that is one's accustomed means of livelihood" (Merriam-Webster 
online edition). According to both definitions, the self-employed occupations are 
far from being marginal or unproductive activities. The question that arises here 
is that, why then do the economic studies on developing countries tend to 
consider such a self-employed entrepreneur as marginal or unproductive. This 
question explains the mainstream's insistence of policies to 'cure' poverty by 
making the poor engaged in self-employed 'activities' into 'proper' entrepreneur. 
What is, then, the meaning of the word 'entrepreneur'? What does it mean to be 
an entrepreneur? According to the dictionary, an entrepreneur is "one who 
organizes, manages, and assumes the risks of a business or enterprise" 
(Merriam-Webster dictionary online edition). Again, the Oxford English dictionary 
defines 'entrepreneur' as "one who undertakes an enterprise; one who owns and 
manages a business; a person who takes the risk of profit or loss" (Oxford 
English Dictionary online edition). Since economics tend to define something as 
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'business' or 'enterprise' in a very narrow term, a self-employed person hardly 
falls into the category of 'entrepreneur'. One who does not reinvest her/his 
accumulated profit into productive investment activities is not considered an 
'entrepreneur'.2 No matter how creative, useful and productive (in terms of the 
capacity and frequency to produce) a self-employed person is, (s)he always 
remains a 'petty trader' due to her/his 'unproductive' usage of the income. For 
example, the following quote of a Ghanaian journalist summarizes how the self-
employed sector is characterized. 
[IJittle reliance can be placed on the Ghanaian entrepreneur for 
rapid development...the Ghanaian businessman's attitude to 
growth is very different from the typical entrepreneur in the early 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in England, for example. He 
remains, even when trading on a fairly large scale, in his approach 
essentially a petty trader. He is in business primarily to make 
money and to spend the money as he makes it on a higher 
standard of living and (somewhat unwillingly) in support of his 
numerous relations. No doubt a government firmly convinced of the 
virtues of private enterprise could encourage the capitalistic virtues 
in the course of time."3 
2
 Hart (1970), Gaughan and Ferman (1987) criticize such a narrow and singular 
use of the term 'entrepreneur'. It has become more like a common-sense matter 
as to who is considered an 'entrepreneur', such has been the power of a singular 
economic model of production. 
3
 J. W. Williams (1963), pp. 196-97, quoted in Hart (1970), pp. 107. Also, studies 
like Tamvada (2010), lyigun and Owen (1999) are plenty in number that 
dissociate entrepreneurship and the productive capability seen in the self-
employed sector. 
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Tokman (2006, 2007) maintains the similar view that the own-account 
workers operate outside the ambit of the modern sector where true 
entrepreneurs work, and that the former is in need of policies that will enable 
them to integrate into the modernization process. The income earned in this 
sector is spent on maintaining the entrepreneur's familial responsibilities, as the 
above quote mentions, and it can also be spent on various other interests. Such 
interests, from the point of view of capitalist accumulation, are unproductive and 
therefore not to be incorporated in the study of economic development. This is 
justified by the ethnocentric idea of a homogeneous set of prescriptions for curing 
underdevelopment (Hart, 1970). 
The current subsection of this chapter puts together a non-exhaustive list 
of self-employed occupations commonly engaged-in across India. Different ways 
of categorization of the occupations have been discussed. 
Self-employed occupations that exist in India are very hard to put into a 
single list. Yet it is important to list them, however incomplete it may be, to clarify 
the difference between the occupations in question and work in other sectors, 
particularly the casualized wage labor work in the subcontracted informal sector. 
Table 3.1 in the next page presents a microcosm of various types of self-
employed occupations seen in India. Despite being incomplete, this list reflects 
the level of variety present in the self-employed sector. 
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Table 3.1: Self-employed occupations in India 
1. Garbage picker 
2. Maid servant 












15. Door-to-door sales person 
16. Street vendor - ready-to-eat food 
17. Street vendor - vegetable and fish 




22. Service provider in tourist areas 
23. Recycler- paper, glass, old items pickers 
24. Household units producing various food items (papad, pickles, clarified butter, 
molasses etc), package materials (paper packet etc) 
25. Rickshaw, cart puller 
26. Freelance worker (writer, journalist, photographer etc) 






33. House painter 
34. Cigarette roller 





Table 3.2: Categorization of Self-employed Occupations 
Occupations 
1. Garbage-picker 
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33. House painter 

























































Source: Own creation, from numerous documentations, newspaper and media 
reports and sociological studies. 
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Table 3.2 attempts to categorize the occupations according to three 
different criteria. The occupations may be rural or urban, goods or service 
providers and female or male centric. It should be noted here that the 
categorizations does not indicate any water-tight compartmentalization; - instead 
it represents the major tendencies of the occupations. In other words, listing 
plumber or electrician under the category of urban does not mean that those 
occupations are completely absent from rural India. It only indicates that in most 
of the cases in India such occupations are seen in urban areas. 
On the other hand, potters or free-lance workers like the newspaper 
reporters, writers and photographers are listed as male-centric, only to 
emphasize that there are far more male potters and free-lance workers in India 
than their female counterparts. 
Table 3.2 shows some patterns in terms of the categorization of the 
occupations. First, there are more urban self-employed occupations than rural. 
The reason behind this phenomenon could be the fact that a majority of the rural 
population are agricultural, leading to a much lesser variety of rural-self-
employed occupations. The greater complexity and interdependence of work and 
living found in urban spaces create the space for a variety of self-employed 
occupations. The majority of the self-employed service providers earn their living 
in the urban areas, which may be due to both a lack of similar demand and 
affordability in the rural areas. For example, there is low need for a pickles seller, 
washer-(wo)man or a house-painter as most rural household are self-dependent 
for such items. Again, hawkers on the bus, rickshaw-pullers or hairdressers are 
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primarily urban professions. The second observation is that there are more male-
centric, self-employed occupations than female-centric. This is due to various 
reasons. The existing gendered division of labor leads to a pre-specified role 
playing by male and female self-employed persons. Traditionally, women have 
worked inside the house, on the family farm or in a family enterprise. Whenever 
women entered the recognized workforce, it has more been as a wage worker 
than an independent entrepreneur (Harris-White 2003). Moreover, work of a 
barber, cobbler, carpenter, fishermen, hawker in trains or buses have traditionally 
been male work, due to various customs and regulations. Apart from that, women 
have not taken part in the occupations like porters, rickshaw or cart-pullers, as 
such heavy manual work has always been for male workers. As a consequence, 
the majority of female self-employed workers engage in household production of 
various food items (pickles, clarified butter, molasses, various fried snacks, lentil-
dumplings, spicy mixtures, puffed rice, papad, roasted chickpea and peanut, 
various sweets, candies etc) and package materials (paper packets, hand-rolled 
jute ropes, weaved baskets etc). 
A third observation from Table 3.2 would be the difference between the 
number of occupations under the category of goods provider and services 
provider. There are more service-providing occupations in the self-employed 
sectors than goods-providing occupations. This is simply because different types 
of services can be listed as different occupations much more clearly than 
different types of goods. For example, a number of goods can be grouped under 
the category of household units producing food items, whereas the services of a 
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barber, cobbler, janitor, tailor or a mason are hard to group together. For this 
reason, goods are more grouped together (under the categories of 'street 
vendors', 'hawkers', 'sales person', or 'household producing food items', for 
example). 
Table 3.2 is meant to represent the types and patterns of different 
entrepreneurial activities available in the self-employed sector in India. Here the 
term 'entrepreneurial' is used differently, in a much broader sense than its 
conventional use. The next subsection explains the production relationships 
between the self-employed sector, the society and the formal sector. 
One important point needs to be noted about the categorization of the self-
employed occupations presented before. The Counterparts of a number of the 
occupations listed in the table are recognized as 'occupations' by the Indian 
National Classification of Occupations - NCO (2004). The self-employed, small-
scale economic activities are clubbed together as 'elementary occupations' in the 
NCO (such as, garbage-picker, maid servant, cobbler, barber, janitor, washer-
woman, door-to-door sales person, both types of street vendors, hawker in trains 
and buses, porter, fisherman, rickshaw and cart puller, newspaper deliverer, 
milkman and cloth presser). But, occupations that did not get classified are the 
followings; Household units producing various food items (papad, pickles, 
clarified butter, molasses etc.), package materials (paper packet etc.), freelance 
worker (writer, journalist, photographer), private tutor, moneylender, priest and 
prostitute. 
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(The solid and the dotted arrows represent physical and monetary flows in the economy) 
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3.3 System of Production in the Self-employed Sector 
3.3.1 Production 
3.3.1.1 Major Characteristics 
Often-times, the chaotic and complex production system of the self-
employed sector is simply left out of economic analyses. This subsection 
explains the system of production that the self-employed sector follows. Figure 
3.1 represents a concise version of the system of production. The interactions 
between the self-employed sector, the formal sector and the rest of the society 
have been demonstrated in this system-diagram. Although the self-employed and 
the formal sector are integral parts of the society in common terms, this figure 
considers them as separate entities only to differentiate between their specific 
economic roles to each other. The society is stratified in the diagram, to 
emphasize the various types of group-formations. A household is a part of a 
neighborhood of a village or a town within a state. Several such households can 
be a part of an imagined group belonging to same caste of religion. Often, groups 
formed according to caste, language, or religion can transcend the boundaries of 
states. For example, a Muslim family producing traditional food items made of 
semolina (used during Muslim religious festivals throughout the year) may still 
belong to the same religious group even after they migrate from the state of 
Gujarat to Rajasthan. Again, a cattle-raiser from the state of Bihar belonging to 
the caste kahar can migrate to the state of West Bengal where other kahars live 
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and work as a milkman.4 Jan Breman (1987) describes similar cases of cross-
state migration out of the West Indian state of Gujarat. Such groups ensure the 
rights to inputs and production processes. For example, access to various types 
of tangible and intangible inputs of a self-employed street-vendor depends upon 
her belonging to a particular neighborhood, slum, and/or a particular caste. Or, a 
maid-servant has a steady access to work due to the community she lives in. 
The self-employed sector in Figure 3.1 involves in two levels of economic 
interactions with the society. The first is with the household (s)he belongs to, and 
the other is with the different groups (s)he is a part of. It is to be noted that not 
every self-employed person interacts economically with all the groups (s)he 
belongs to at all times. There exists an unwritten understanding of whether (s)he 
shares resources with her/his fellow slum-dwellers or with those from the same 
caste group. Such understanding is put in place by the time, space and type of 
work (s)he engages in. For example, a porter at a train station gets the entry into 
the job market through the network of his fellow villagers who have migrated to 
the city and live together in a ghetto. Again, a garbage-picker depends upon the 
neighborhood (s)he lives in (Sule 2005, Kamat 2010).5 
4
 Similar stories of migration are very common in India. Despite frictions among 
the already migrated, the state-natives and the new migrants, such migrations 
have allowed people to work as self-employed (along with wage work), 
particularly in cities. Self-employment among the migrants was possible partly 
due to the caste, language and religion-based network formations. Daily 
newspapers (e.g. The Telegraph, 02.24.08) regularly report on the utilization of 
such vote banks by different political parties. 
5
 Also, Power (2006) and Birckbeck (1979) provide detailed account of the 
economy of the garbage industries of Manila, Philippines and Cali, Colombia 
respectively. 
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A self-employed production unit, which can either be a person, a family or 
an informal enterprise employing labor, depends on the household or various 
other social groups or networks for resources and inputs. Similarly, the returns to 
the inputs are determined or at the least, influenced by the support of the network 
as well. On the other hand, the self-employed sector can also avail itself of the 
inputs of production from the formal sector in exchange of the payment of rent for 
capital and other equipments and price for other inputs (such as the gadgets of a 
hairdresser, carpenter or a tailor). The key point to be noted here is the 
difference between the procurement and valuation of inputs from the social 
network groups as compared with the formal sector. Explanation and analysis of 
this difference is one of the major contributions of this chapter. 
3.3.1.2 Valuation of Inputs 
A self-employed tailor can rent the sewing machine from a registered 
machine renting firm and buy the sewing materials such as the needles, the 
threads and the buttons from a registered shop at a price determined according 
to the law of demand and supply. The production function in this case may not 
look different from conventional production functions. If one sewing machine, two 
needles, three yarns of thread, six buttons and 2 labor hours are required to 
make one Indian shirt, then the production function can be written as, 
S = min {M, N/2, T/3, B/6, L/2} 
Where M = sewing machine, 
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N = needle 
T = thread 
B = button 
S = shirt 
L = labor hour. 
The inputs are paid according to their market determined value of 
marginal productivities, when they are bought or rented from formal enterprises. 
Thus, the buyer/renter and the supplier of the inputs come together for the 
exchange of inputs following the terms of the market. It is not hard to identify the 
buyer and the supplier of the inputs of production. Inputs thus obtained from the 
formal sector by the self-employed sector are combined to produce an output 
that promises a higher value. 
Such a method of accessing inputs and the determination of their values 
do not work in cases when the self-employed sector procures the inputs from the 
social groups. This is because the self-employed production entities are 
embedded within the social groups and it is very hard to physically differentiate 
the producing units and the network it belongs to. The access to inputs follows a 
different arrangement of property rights. Also, the determination of their values 
often defies the logic of marginal productivity. 
In order to understand the dynamics of the self-employed production 
processes, it is important to recognize that the concept of property, resources 
and access to them are very different from what the neoclassical economic 
theories believe, often intangible and immeasurable. Such intangible property 
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rights are exercised through behavioral relations among the individuals belonging 
to a social network as well as the existing norms and conventions of the groups. 
Such norms and regulations produce informal institutions and lead to wealth-
generating productive activities.6 Such institutions can often be extralegal, as 
Harris-White (2003) and Jagannathan (1987) pointed out, and can fill the gap 
created by the weak formal institutions present in the self-employed sector. Rules 
and regulations of extralegal property rights are byproducts of unwritten 
conventions. For example, cart-pullers, service providers at a tourist spot, 
hawkers on trains and buses, or street-vendors follow the regulations of territorial 
sharing that is a result of many years of unwritten norms prevailing in the area. 
Preoccupancy with the legality of property rights does not lead one to understand 
such behavioral arrangements. Again, convenience of repeatedly buying or 
renting vending carts or raw materials from a single seller leads to an invisible 
contract that generates input for the buyer/renter and a regular income for the 
supplier. Such mutually beneficial arrangement relies upon the simple human 
nature of habit of regularity. And the ensured income stream is the intangible 
asset which Thorstein Veblen (1908) pointed out in the following quote: 
The intangible assets capitalize the preferential use of certain facts 
of human nature - habits, propensities, beliefs, aspirations, 
necessities - to be dealt with under the psychological laws of 
human motivation. 
6
 Jagannathan (1987) provides extensive analysis of such informal property right 
arrangements. 
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The behavioral relationships among and between the social groups as 
well as among the individuals are crucial determinants of the availability of inputs 
for various self-employed production endeavors. The informal institutions that 
emerge out of the behavioral relationships often take a more complex form when 
the relationships become multi-lateral. If families of three brothers own a plot of 
land, sell vegetables from the land and run a street-side food-stall, each member 
of the extended family engages in behavioral relation with each other at multiple 
levels. This is most commonly seen among the agricultural families or 
communities. Such multi-lateral informal contracts may take place among bigger 
groups of same caste, village or religion. Such multi-lateral behavioral 
relationships indicate the existence of a strong kinship network among the self-
employed people. The strength of kinship network often determines or at the 
least, influences the availability of various inputs of production. 





The role of a kinship network can be identified at two different levels, as 
represented in Figure 3.2. First, a strong sense of kinship assures the availability 
of resources through various bi-lateral or multi-lateral informal contracts as 
discussed above. The Indian joint-family-owned production systems are a good 
example in this case. Agricultural families and communities, sharing common 
water, energy sources or pastoral land provide income streams for all those who 
enter the unwritten contract. Such informal contracts through kinship associations 
ensuring joint share of resources and access to other inputs like equipment of 
farming, of a potter, a barber or a cobbler, can be termed as Kinship Sharing. 
Kinship Sharing primarily means sharing of common resources.7 Another type of 
kinship network support can be identified and separated from Kinship Sharing, 
predominantly in urban areas and among the communities lacking any common 
resource pool such as pastoral land, forests, village ponds, rivers, watersheds 
etc. People who migrate from rural to the urban areas after being displaced from 
their land, often end up in various self-employed occupations. 
Rural-urban migration and the increase in the number of urban slum-
dwelling, self-employed population are common in the developing countries. Mike 
Davis (2003) provides an excellent and extensive account of such population in 
various cities of the developing world. The reason behind the growing urban, self-
employed population is manifold. The pressure of turning agricultural land in to 
grazing land, factories or increasing economic burden through higher rents or 
taxes have resulted in a mass displacement, the majority of which have been 
7
 Chopra and Dasgupta (2002) discuss different common pool resources in India. 
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absorbed in the self-employed sector. People who lost access to common 
resources (such as land, water, forest etc) and started working as a hawker, a 
rickshaw-puller or a porter, started to rely upon a different kind of kinship 
network. The bi-lateral contracts between a buyer/renter and the supplier of 
vending cart or sewing machine or raw materials for making readymade food 
items start and thrive upon the kinship bond between them. Such kinship may be 
due to the fact that they both belong to the same village, caste or religion, and 
can be termed as Kinship Support. Kinship Support can replace Kinship Sharing 
for those who migrate from rural to urban areas. Those who have been a part of 
urban self-employed workforce for a longer time and had never been a rural * 
worker, Kinship Support turns out to be the only kinship experience they ever 
had. Such Kinship Support becomes a source of sustenance for people who lost 
their home and access to resources due to the Tehri Dam project in the 
Himalayan Mountains, the mining projects in the state or Bihar and Jharkhand, or 
the Sardar Sarovar Dam on River Narmada in Western India.8 
So far, the role of informal institutions built upon the behavioral 
relationships has been demonstrated. Two types of kinship association and their 
roles in ensuring the availability of resources and inputs of production have been 
laid out as well. A generalized functional relationship between the inputs of 
production and the output can be represented as the following: 
Numerous accounts are available on the displacement of rural population due 
to industrial projects, and their dependence on the community they belong to. 
The Narmada Bachao Andolan is one reliable source of such information. Also 
the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center regularly documents such 
displacements and growing support of communities within themselves. 
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Y = f (Labor, Capital, Equipment), 
where Y is the output. The availability of capital and equipments are in 
part dependent on the strength of the kinship network the producer belongs to. 
Labor is completely dependent upon the kinship network support. The reason is 
simple, even when a family member works in a self-employment endeavor, that 
labor is obtained because of the existence of family. On the other hand, money 
can be borrowed from a formal sector bank without the help of kinship network. 
Similarly, equipment can also be borrowed or bought from a registered 
lender/seller. Therefore, the functional relationship of production can be written 
as, 
Y = f [LKNS, (aK + KKNS), (bE + EKNs)] 
where a, b are constants denoting the fraction of capital and equipment 
needed for one unit of output, and aK, bE are the portions of capital and 
equipment that are obtained without the support of the kinship network. LKNS > 
KKNS , EKNS are the portions of labor, capital and equipments respectively that are 
obtained because of the kinship network support (KNS). Clearly, the inputs are 
perfectly, imperfectly or non substitutable, depending upon a particular 
occupation. For example, if the above functional relationship of production is 
considered for a garbage-picker, the equipments or the capital to buy the 
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equipments (the pointed stick to sort out garbage, the bowl to beg) can be 
completely substitutable with own hand, where that extra use of hand may be 
considered as additional labor.9 On the other hand, a barber, a blacksmith or a 
cobbler can substitute some amount of labor for equipment and vice-versa, but it 
may not be possible to fully substitute one input for the other. Again, a cart-puller, 
a porter, a potter or a rickshaw-puller may not do without their cart, head-frame to 
carry weight, the pottery-wheel or the rickshaw respectively. Therefore, the 
equipments are non-substitutable with labor. More labor will not fetch higher 
output without the other inputs (which is somewhat similar to a fixed-coefficient 
production function). 
Since the above functional relationship is a generalized version of all the 
self-employed occupations, the extent of returns to scale is hard to specify. 
Increasing all the inputs may increase the output more than, less than or equally 
proportionately depending upon the nature of a particular occupation. On the 
other hand, an intriguing feature of the production relationship existing in the self-
employed sector is the often ambiguous existence of diminishing marginal 
productivity. Non-decreasing marginal productivity may be found in various 
occupations. For example, garbage-pickers, maid-servants, prostitutes, potters, 
porters, rickshaw-pullers or even private tutors may produce equal marginal 
amount of goods or services by increasing labor-hour, while holding other inputs 
constant. But this may not be applicable in case of other inputs such as capital or 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/27/world/asia/27ragpickers.html 
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equipment. In other words, the higher the extent of labor intensity higher is the 
chances of non-decreasing marginal productivity. 
3.3.2 Cost of Production 
The other side of the functional relationship is cost, which is what this 
subsection analyzes. The major constitutive part of the cost of production for any 
self-employed worker (similar to any other type of worker/producer) is the values 
of inputs. Hence the determination of the values of the inputs is crucial in 
understanding the nature of costs a self-employed person bears. Since the 
procurement of inputs differs in terms of their sources (i.e. whether an input is 
obtained from the formal sector or via the behavioral relationships among various 
social groups), the determination of the values of the inputs follow two different 
rules. First is the logic of the value of marginal product (the neoclassical 
convention) and is applicable to the inputs procured from the formal sector. The 
rent or price of equipment or the rent of the borrowed capital is paid to the 
formally registered bank, shop or firm according to the value of its marginal 
product. Let, the payments for inputs made to the formal sector are labeled as 
Formal Payment. 
The second method of value determination is applicable to the inputs 
acquired from different social groups through various informal institutions. This 
method is analyzed here through the use of various examples. Let, for the sake 
of convenience, all payments to the social groups in return to the inputs and 
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resources are called Returns to Society. This is the collective of all the values of 
capital, labor, equipments as well as other resources. Depending upon the 
source of the inputs, the costs of each input may or may not be separable. For 
example, if all the inputs are obtained from the family, the costs are not 
separable, whereas the cost of the vending cart of a street-food vendor rented 
from the local lender belonging to the same village can be separated from the 
return to the labor the vendor's family put in to cook the food. 
There can be another component of the cost of production, which includes 
transportation costs, regular bribes paid to the local political party, local goons 
and the police for the use of the public space (where the exchange physically 
takes place), and other miscellaneous payments. If these costs are termed as 
Cost of Use, the total cost of production can be written as follows, 
Cost of production = Formal Payments + Returns to Society + Cost of 
Use. 
Clearly, any one of the components above may be equal to zero 
depending upon the type of occupation one considers. In this analysis, let us 
assume that Returns to Society ± 0. This assumption helps us to differentiate 
between the typical neoclassical convention of production and cost and the cost 
of production in the self-employed sector, and analyze the process of 
determination of the values of inputs obtained through informal institutions. 
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The values of each input can be examined one by one. Let us first turn to 
capital. Depending upon the requirement of each different occupations, the use 
of capital may vary widely. For example, a street vendor of food items may need 
a regular flow of money to buy raw materials, as opposed to a maid-servant, who 
needs virtually no money to produce her service (excepting the money she needs 
to buy food to replenish her daily labor). A majority of street vendors (including 
food and other various items) depend upon money loaned from an informal 
moneylender, members of extended family or from the village/town community 
they belong to.10 The interest rate paid for the loaned capital varies enormously, 
depending upon highly subjective reasons. If the lender is a known and 
trustworthy member of a village/town community, the interest rate is much lower 
than that charged by a moneylender with whom the relationship is impersonal. 
Interest charged on the loan is even lower when the lender is a family member 
(NASVI report, 1998). Therefore, the determination of the rate of interest varies 
according to the strength of the kinship bonding between the lender and the 
borrower. Although the difference between the interest charged by a 
moneylender and a community member is usually explained by Kinship Support 
as explained above, but the exact rate of interest charged by, say, a 
moneylender appears to follow the logic of monopoly. Often, the number of 
moneylenders is low enough for them to charge a very high and exploitative rate 
10
 The Bhowmik report published after 1998 by the National Alliance of Street 
Vendors of India (NASVI) shows that about 53-55% of the street vendors 
surveyed in seven Indian cities loan money from informal moneylenders of 
members from own community. 
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of interest. This may vary depending upon whether the borrower is a regular and 
known to the moneylender. Such a fact, once again, emphasizes the extent of 
unwritten informal contract generated through the particular behavioral 
relationship between the lender and the borrower. 
A similar invisible contract determines the rent or the price of equipment 
rented or bought by various self-employed workers. For example, a vegetable 
vendor may borrow vegetables from a wholesaler in advance, without any 
payment upfront, and pays only after the items are sold in the market. Such an 
arrangement is common among various other types of street vendors, hawkers, 
carpenters, rickshaw or cart-pullers and many other self-employed persons 
(NASVI report 1998, India Together report on rickshaw-pullers of Delhi, 
November 2001, Burke 2010). For an agricultural joint family, the farming 
equipment such as a plough or other machinery can be used by any family 
member without any rent or price in return. Instead, there are other services or 
payments in kind that can take the place of a payment.11 Such returns can take 
various forms. For example, a family member, when uses the irrigation pump 
owned jointly with the rest of the family, may reciprocate by paying for the 
electricity used to run the pump or by procuring fertilizers for the farm. Similar 
arrangements are very common among the Indian farming families. A street food 
vendor or a hawker selling homemade candies on the train may use the utensils 
11
 The transactions in kind represent what is known as the barter system. The 
presence of such system is one reason behind the inapplicability of the 
conventional optimization process, as argued in section 3.4 of this chapter. 
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of her/his family members to prepare the items, and in return pay with food and 
living space for them (Jellineck 1997, NASVI 1998). 
Such services advanced in return are termed as 'reciprocal services' by 
Gaughan and Ferman (1987), who applied the term originally coined by Marshall 
Sahlins (1972). Gaughan and Ferman (1987) use the concept of reciprocal 
services to emphasize the noneconomic institutions in informal self-employed 
sector, a quick recapitulation of the discussion forwarded in chapter 1 of this 
research should be sufficient to remind that Sahlins (1972) recommended three 
types of reciprocal services or responsibilities. They are, generalized reciprocity, 
balanced reciprocity, and negative reciprocity. The putatively altruistic 
transactions like voluntary food sharing, the equivalent exchanges of materials 
between two economic agents, or the forms of appropriations aimed at 
maximizing utilitarian advantage even when the return is greater than what is 
offered, are the three forms of reciprocities that prevail in the self-employed 
economies. The degree of kinship bonding determines the type of reciprocity one 
engages in. For example, familial and residential groups depend primarily upon 
generalized reciprocities; village, tribe or similar larger communities rely on 
balanced reciprocities, and negative reciprocities are found in groups outside 
such known communities, where the economic agents are strangers to each 
other (Gaughan and Ferman 1987). Hence, in various modalities of production in 
the self-employed sector, conventional value of inputs often gets replaced by 
reciprocal responsibilities, the extent of which is determined by the strength of 
kinship bonding the producer/worker belongs to. 
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The similar informal arrangement can be seen in case of the labor input. 
Since labor is expected to be obtained not from the formal sector, but from the 
self, the family or any immediate community one is a part of, the return to labor is 
often determined according to the existing perception of reciprocal 
responsibilities, which again is often built upon the prevailing norms, customs or 
conventions of a particular social group. For example, fellow villagers or 
members of the extended family, same-caste or same-religion group often 
migrate to the workplace of a self-employed vendor, hawker, porter or a cart-
puller to work as an apprentice or helper. (S)he shares the labor in return to food 
and living space and some expected future earnings (Hart 1970, Jellineck 1997, 
NASVI report 1998, India Together report 2001). 
Hence, it is seen here that the value of inputs are determined through a 
very subjective, complex process not lending itself to abstract modeling, and are 
often paid in terms of various reciprocal responsibilities. The degree of kinship 
association, which could either be Kinship Sharing or Kinship Support, affirms 
certain amount of reciprocal services. There are indeed some types of rent or 
interest payment, the term of which is often influenced by the nature of kinship 
association one has with the lender. In other words, the strength of kinship 
bonding decides the proportion of the return to the society that is to be paid in 
terms of reciprocity. 
The third type of payment that constitutes the cost of production is termed 
here as Cost of Use. This includes various regular and irregular payments that 
are made, especially to carry out the act of exchange. Such payments are far 
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from being negligible, especially with respect to the meager income of a lot of the 
self-employed workers. It may include the regular bribe paid to the traffic police, 
the 'protection money' paid to the local political party and/or the local musclemen 
in return for no harassment, the fines paid to the municipal authorities to get back 
the confiscated goods and equipment, money paid to the local clubs or groups 
under the pretext of festivals etc.(NASVI report 1998, India Together report 2001, 
Power 2006). It may also include the transportation costs for the daily migrant 
workers who come to the cities from suburbs to work as maid-servants, vendors, 
mechanics, plumbers, construction workers etc.12 The Cost of Use is usually a 
'transfer payment' paid to people not belonging to the same social group as a 
self-employed worker. This is another type of impersonal payment (second to the 
Formal Payment). The kinship bond may still work if the self-employed worker 
belongs to the same political party whose local wing demands the bribe, or if the 
local goon belongs to the same caste, religion or village. Most often, when the 
extortionists are from different social group, or when it is the policeman or the 
local corrupt authority who demands money, the payment made is impersonal 
and exploitative by nature. Nevertheless, such payments often make up 
significant part of the cost of production incurred by a self-employed worker. 
The cost of production, hence, is a sum of Formal Payments, Returns to 
Society and Cost of Use, as discussed above. A pertinent question may arise 
12
 For example, there are designated vendor compartments in Indian local trains 
for the vendors to commute with their produces and materials. They vendors 
usually buy a monthly pass for their commute (though there are often fare 
evasions) 
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here, as to whether the determination of the reciprocal services is similar to the 
determination of the value of marginal product. In other words, whether the 
factors of production are paid according to the value of their marginal product. 
Various examples can be thought of, where the amount of reciprocal services is 
derived from subjective perception of how much a person offering labor or other 
equipments deserve to be paid. That perception may well stem from completely 
noneconomic factors, without having anything to do with the marginal productivity 
of the labor or equipment. For example, when the wife of a hawker puts labor-
hours to prepare the candies at home, she receives food and living space equally 
with her daughter, even when the latter does not put any labor-hour into the work 
(Hart 1970, Breman 1996, Jellineck 1997, Power 2006). Similarly, the rate of 
interest charged by a moneylender to a fellow villager belonging to the same 
caste is lower than what is charged to a borrower from a different social group. 
The difference is subjectively conceived by the moneylender through an informal 
negotiation with the borrower, according to the extent of kinship among 
themselves. The exchanges may well be exploitative in nature, particularly when 
it takes place between two parties belonging to two different social groups. Such 
negotiation may not incorporate any study of the marginal product of the capital 
in question. 
One important reason behind the absence of the application of the law of 
marginal product is the horizontal division of labor. In a self-employed production 
process, the work is divided among the family or community members according 
to two norms, one's biological capacity and existing cultural conventions. 
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Different stages of producing bidis (local cigarettes) are done by the family 
members depending upon their capability, age and gender. For example, the 
women of the family roll the tobacco, the children prepare the glue and the men 
carries the cigarettes to the marketplace. Traditionally, smoking or handling 
cigarettes by women are considered a taboo, children cannot roll tobacco or sell 
them in the market, and the men are considered inefficient to roll the cigarettes 
due to their thick fingers. Therefore, the division of labor follows a combination of 
cultural norms as well as biological feasibility. The division of labor therefore 
does not follow the hierarchical boss-worker model, and can be termed as 
horizontal division of labor (as opposed to the vertical division seen in wage 
working sectors). The return the women and children receive in the form of food 
and living space follows one's specific need, and not the amount of work they 
have put in. The altruistic sharing of food and other items needed for survival, the 
equivalent exchange of materials or money, or the exploitative extraction of labor 
or other inputs for a smaller return, all three types of reciprocity is directed by the 
subjective perception of kinship association than the value of marginal product. 
The absence of the law of marginal product, especially of labor, poses to 
be one major difference between the production process in the wage working 
sector and the self-employed sector. The next subsection explains the other 
types of income earned by various self-employed workers. 
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3.3.3 Other Income 
There are other sources of income that can be earned as well in the self-
employed occupations. For example, garbage-pickers regularly sort and select 
items from the garbage that they use or consume themselves (Sule 2005, Power 
2006). Selling such a picked-up good in exchange for consumption items is very 
common (Gentleman 2007). Again, maid-servants usually receive food and 
sometimes clothes from the families they work for. Similar transfer payments in 
kind are common for self-employed people in various other occupations, such as 
vendors, door-to-door sales persons, washer (wo)men, janitors, priests etc. 
Another significant factor contributing to the income of the self-employed 
workers is the transfer income earned from various government welfare 
programs. In the case of India, several government welfare program have been 
in place to assist the poorer section of the population in their survival struggle. 
For example, the national rural employment guarantee program (NREG) helps 
the rural poor to get a minimum of 100 days of work at the minimum wage. This 
income is usually added to the other earning attempts of the rural poor, which is 
usually in the self-employed sector. Again, the Public Distribution System of India 
distributes food grains at subsidized prices to the poor population. There are 
other programs in place such as the National Rural Employment Program 
(NREP), Rural Labor Employment Guarantee Program (RLEGP), Million Wells 
Scheme (MWS), National Rural Health Mission (NRHM), among others. Although 
there were and there still are a number of rearrangements on the part of the 
government which adversely affected the beneficiaries of such welfare programs, 
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the programs replenish the income earned by the self-employed population at a 
varied rate.13 
3.4 The Inapplicability of Optimization Process 
This section explains the reason behind the inapplicability of an 
optimization process into the understanding of the system of production in the 
self-employed sector. Before demonstrating the reasons, it is to be noted that 
there are two types of sectoral economic interactions that the self-employed 
people engage in. The first interaction is inter-sectoral, between the self-
employed and the formal sector and the other one includes the intra-sectoral 
interactions that take place within the self-employed sector. The inter-sectoral 
interactions, as examined in the above subsections, often follow the capitalistic 
model of business, particularly when a self-employed person buys or borrows 
inputs of production from the formal enterprise, businesses or financial 
institutions. The rest of this subsection focuses upon the intra-sectoral economic 
interactions in the self-employed sector, where the buying, selling or borrowing 
happens between two or more self-employed production units. 
The major part of the reason behind the inapplicability of an optimization 
process lays in the character of the self-employed sector, in the incredibly 
complex, subjective and ever-changing nature of this sector. The self-employed 
sector lends itself to a lack of theoretical understanding primarily because of the 
13
 A description of the extent of the welfare programs, their targets and their 
actual impact is available in Banerjee-Chakraborty (2009), among others. 
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enormous extent of heterogeneity present in the production processes of its 
various occupations. This section argues that it is the neoclassical theory of profit 
maximization that fails to comprehend the self-employed sector. Indeed, a 
different road can be taken to better understand the productive processes of this 
sector. In order to create a different way of understanding the self-employed 
sector, this research builds the stepping stone by providing an organized 
amalgamation of the reasons for the non-viability of a neoclassical optimization 
process, in explaining the economy of the self-employed sector. 
An optimization process requires the first-order condition to hold. Such 
necessary first-order condition implies that the value of the marginal product of 
the inputs is to be equal to the price paid to the inputs. This condition frequently 
fails to hold in the self-employed sector, which is a major reason behind the 
incompatibility of the optimization process with the self-employed sector. Often-
times, the value of the inputs used in a production process is determined in such 
a way that does not follow the law of marginal productivity. In other words, the 
inputs are often paid not according to the value of their marginal products, 
instead, various informal institutions that emerge out of highly subjective social 
networks determine the values of the inputs. If, in a self-employed occupation, all 
or some of the inputs come from within the family (which is often the case for the 
agricultural worker, the street vendor, the priest, the cigarette-roller or the 
household unit producing food items and packaged material), there is a 
preconceived notion of the return each input receives. For example, each one of 
the family receives the return to their labor according to the concept of what each 
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person needs, irrespective of how much labor they put in. Such determination of 
input values follows a cultural norm of understanding one's survival need existing 
in the community, which the family belongs to. The social and cultural norms 
prevailing in a community dictates the division of labor in the self-employed 
occupations. The division of labor existing in the self-employed sector can be 
labeled as the horizontal division of labor, where the boss-employer vertical 
division is absent. Such horizontal division of labor leads to the determination of 
the returns to the inputs in a way that relies more on the noneconomic 
understanding of 'need', rather than the 'value of the marginal product'. 
In the case of the self-employed occupations that rely upon the 
communities outside the family, the returns to the inputs frequently follow various 
noneconomic customs and norms, thereby making the formulation of a 
neoclassical optimization model impossible. The equipments bought or 
borrowed, the monetary capital borrowed from outside the family follow the rules 
of informal negotiations between the buyer/borrower and the seller/lender. The 
strength of Kinship Network determines the types of such negotiations and in 
turn, the returns to the inputs. The variedness of the types of negotiations 
present in the self-employed sector does not lend itself to an optimization 
exercise. The price of the inputs may or may not be paid up front (NASVI report 
1998, India Together 2001, Burke 2010); the inputs belonging to a family 
member may not require any recognizable and/or measurable return (Jellineck 
1997, NASVI report 1998); the interest charged for a sum of money borrowed 
from a moneylender may vary according to whether the borrower belongs to the 
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same village or caste community (NASVI report 1998); the moneylender may 
charge the borrower a highly exploitative interest if the borrower is unknown and 
therefore untrustworthy (Gaughan and Ferman 1987). All these examples 
emphasize the strength of the underlying Kinship Network, which is subjective 
enough to bar one from undertaking an optimization exercise. The fact that the 
subjective contracts not only exist in the self-employed sector, but influence the 
economic activities of the vast population belonging to this sector, requires a 
better understanding of the role of noneconomic factors in economic decision 
making. 
The extent of the Kinship Network leads to the determination of how much 
return an input will receive, often in the form of Reciprocal Services.™ Borrowing 
from Marshall Sahlins' much celebrated work on the Original Affluent Society 
(1972), the Reciprocal Services can be understood in three categories, 
generalized reciprocity (the putatively altruistic exchanges, often between the 
members of the extended family), balanced reciprocity (in case of the 
equivalence of exchange between two economic agents, belonging to the same 
community) and negative reciprocity (the often exploitative exchanges targeted at 
maximizing utilitarian advantages). Depending upon whether the returns are paid 
in terms of money or in kind, the reciprocal services may or may not follow a 
barter system. The conditions of reciprocity seem to a large extent replace the 
14
 Sahlins (1972) coined the term Reciprocal Services in his analysis of the 
Original Affluent Society, and Gaughan and Ferman (1987) have later used it in 
the context of informal workers. Harris-White (2003) uses the term Social 
Structures of Accumulation, which conveys similar meaning. 
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law of marginal productivity. Moreover, the subjective nature of the Kinship 
Support or Kinship Sharing works as the major hindrance for any optimization 
exercise. 
There is another important feature of the self-employed sector, which 
contributes to the complexity of the economy of the self-employed sector. It is the 
frequent changes that occur within the sector. The persistence of poverty, 
inequality and lack of social, economic as well as human rights, which often 
plague the self-employed sector, lead to the precariousness of the occupations, 
availability of inputs, as well as the income earned. Such uncertainties at more 
than one level characterize this sector as an ever-changing sector without proper 
scope for abstract modeling. Many self-employed workers change occupations or 
work in more than one occupations at the same time, due to various types of 
random shocks, risks and vulnerability, or structural factors (Castells and Portes 
1989, Harris-White 2002, 2003). The random shocks may hit a self-employed 
worker or a family in the form of illness, social expenditure, natural calamity, 
widowhood, riots, accidents, bad harvest or drought, while the risks include the 
threat of frequent diseases, death, old-age impairment and child and maternal 
mortality, and several occupational hazards. The risk factor tends to be high in 
certain kinds of work the self-employed people engage in. Dealing with 
hazardous material, low and dangerous quality inputs of production and 
machinery, irregular and long work hours and potentially risky way of work (for 
example, standing for excessively long hours, endearing the harsh weather, 
regularly carrying excess weight, engaging in repetitive movements etc) adds to 
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the vulnerability of a majority of the self-employed population. The rearrangement 
of property rights to accommodate the pressures of industrialization is one of the 
most influential structural factors that results in the high level of insecurity within 
the self-employed sector. The number of internally displaced people in India is 
exorbitantly high. According to some accounts, anywhere between 21 to 33 
million people were displaced to make way for the 3,300 big dams built since the 
Indian independence in 1947, of which the majority is still awaiting rehabilitation 
(Mander 1999, pp 7; IDMC online country report on India, Roy 2000). All these 
factors cumulatively result in the precariousness of the self-employment sector. 
Thus, we see that the precariousness prevailing in the self-employed 
sector along with the frequent replacement of the law of marginal productivity by 
the subjective informal contracts emerging out of the strength of Kinship Network 
one belongs to, and the prevalence of the noneconomic norms and customs 
create a complex system of production. And such complexity does not lend itself 
to any abstract modeling exercise. Rather, a different way of understanding the 
economy of the self-employed sector is required, if we need to find out the ways 
of well-being of the people engaged in this sector. Since a significant proportion 
of the Indian population is self-employed, and since a majority of the poor 
population works in this sector, a better understanding of this sector is crucial. 
And for that, it is important to recognize the inapplicability of the neoclassical 
modeling approach to the study of the economy of the self-employed sector. 
A major factor that contributes in the inadequacy of neoclassical abstract 
modeling exercise is the divergence between the conventional notion of an 
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'entrepreneur' and the economic activities of the self-employed people. Even if 
the English language dictionaries indicate that anyone who takes the risk of 
producing and or trading something can be considered as an 'entrepreneur', 
Economics does not include a producer or a trader into the category of 
'entrepreneur' unless (s)he reinvests her/his accumulated profit into productive 
investment activities. Most of the self-employed people are labeled as 'petty 
traders' due to their incapacity to accumulate profit. In this narrow sense of the 
term, the productive capacity and the capacity of generating livelihood for a vast 
population of the self-employed sector is bound to be overlooked. A better 
understanding of the economy of the self-employed sector is dependent upon the 
recognition of the production relations based on the noneconomic and informal 
institutions, as examined in this chapter. Irrespective of whether a self-employed 
person fits into the category of an 'entrepreneur', the productive capacity, 
creativity and persistence of people engaged in the self-employed sector are 
crucial to acknowledge. 
3.5 Policy Implications 
So far, policies aimed at the self-employed population have either tried to 
replenish the income of the self-employed population, or tried to dislocate them in 
order to reinforce the boundaries of property ownership by the formal sector.15 
15
 There is ample evidence of such displacements by the government-private 
formal sector nexus, starting from the Operation Sunshine to remove the street-
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The former is targeted at short-term management of the pressing issue of 
poverty (since most of the working poor are engaged in the self-employed 
sector), especially for political (electoral) gain. And the latter is based on the 
claim that the expansion of the formal sector through expanding formal 
ownership of resources will trickle down to the disenfranchised population 
through employment generation and various welfare programs. The following 
question may arise: whether the government and the private formal sector has 
the right to undermine the capability of the self-employed sector and determine 
the extent of charity the self-employed sector deserves. Although the answer to 
this question is beyond the scope of this research, it brings about an important 
policy implication. The noneconomic factor of Kinship Network is demonstrated in 
this research as crucial in determining virtually all intra-sectoral production 
relationships. The self-employed sector is extra-legal to the core, and the 
cornerstone of almost all of the productive activities is the informal institution of 
Kinship Network. Therefore, maintaining the community ties at various levels is of 
utmost importance, if the survival strategies of the self-employed population are 
to be given their due space. In many cases, there exists certain level of non-
engagement between the state and the self-employed sector, except for periodic 
income replenishments and/or dislocation by the former. While a displacement 
leads to the dismantling of the community ties, periodic income replenishments 
are hard to connect with the fate of the community networks. This research 
highlights the need of maintaining the community networks, in order not to disrupt 
hawkers in Kolkata, India (Bandyopadhyay 2009) to Displacing the villagers for 
the POSCO steel plant in Kalinganagar, India (Dash and Samal, 2008). 
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the livelihood generating efforts of the self-employed population, especially in the 
absence of any 'trickling down' of the formal sector growth. The community ties 
can be maintained through the preservation of the basic right of the self-
employed population to the common pool resources, which they utilize for the 
supply of inputs, through Kinship Sharing and Kinship Support. A policy that 
protects such right, or at the least does not suspend the right or help disband the 
Kinship Network will be useful for the sector. Since a majority of the poor 
population earns their living from the self-employed sector, a policy that 
recognizes the crucial role of Kinship Network in determining the production 
relationships in this sector and acknowledges its contribution in providing for the 
poor population will prove to be effective. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter is an attempt to recognize the major characteristics of the 
production processes the self-employed population of India undertake. One main 
goal was to trace out the general pattern of the system of production of the self-
employed sector. This chapter first identifies and categorizes the major self-
employed occupations seen in India. After that, this research proposes a system 
view of the economy of the self-employed sector, along with the detailed 
examination of the major features of the production processes. Such examination 
brings out the differences between the production in the self-employed sector 
and the sector employing wage workers, the differences help us to reflect upon 
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the inadequacy of a neoclassical abstract modeling exercise in explaining the 
economy of the self-employed sector. 
This chapter contributes to the existing small number of economic 
literature on the self-employed sector in three ways. It identifies the main features 
of the production processes through building a system view of the self-employed 
economy, examines the determinants of the particular production relations 
existing in the sector, and demonstrates the reason behind the inadequacy of a 
neoclassical optimization process. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This dissertation attempts to incorporate the self-employed sector into the 
economic discourse about the informal sector. This study also examines the link 
between two prominent features of the Indian economy, namely, the trade 
liberalization policies and the informal sector. Specifically, it traces out the impact 
of the trade liberalization policies on the wages of the informal sector. It brings 
out the role of the self-employed sector in affecting the informal sector wages. 
Chapter 1 presents a thorough review of the existing literature on the 
definitions and origin of the informal sector, and discusses the extent of the 
debate existing among the researchers. The complexity, subjectivity and the 
variety of production relations existing in the informal sector is outlined in this 
chapter. This chapter finds out that it is quite challenging to put forth a singular 
definition of the informal sector and to fit this sector into economic models in its 
entirety. There are at least three competing schools of thought, which define and 
perceive the informal sector in three different manners. The Dualist school 
considers this sector as a sector consisting of marginal economic activities that 
arises due to the failure of the formal growth to trickle down. The Structuralist 
school considers this sector as subordinated to the formal sector, helps the 
formal sector to reduce its cost of production, and arises due to the structural 
faults of the capitalist development itself. Again, the Legalist school believes that 
it is the state regulations that give rise to the informal sector, through which 
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entrepreneurs try to evade regulations. According to the Legalist school, all state 
regulations should be eliminated to 'cure' the problem of informal sector. Such 
ideological differences are expected to lead the researchers to model the 
informal sector in conflicting ways. But studies that have tried to model this sector 
have often leaned towards the Dualist and the Legalist schools of thought. A 
number of studies have attempted to model the informal sector as either a cluster 
of workers employed casually by the formal sector, or a sector that exists only to 
produce intermediate goods for the formal sector. Although this dissertation 
does not aim at emphasizing one school of thought over the other, it raises two 
important questions. First, how historically accurate it is to question the origin of 
the informal sector, presupposing the precedence of the formal sector? And 
second, why does the informal sector always comprise only of a sector producing 
intermediate goods for the formal sector? While the first question will be 
addressed in a future research, this dissertation undertakes the task of filling the 
gap in the existing body of researches by incorporating the self-employed 
informal sector. 
Chapter 2 traces out the link between the trade liberalization policies and 
the wages of the informal sector, when the informal self-employed and the 
informal subcontracted sectors are incorporated as two separate sectors. This is 
done through developing a four-sector general equilibrium model that is based 
upon the theory of a small open economy. A major implication that this 
theoretical model brings out is that the employment in the self-employed sector 
and the share of labor in this sector plays crucial role in influencing the informal 
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sector wage, in an environment of diminishing trade barriers. When the trade 
barriers are decreasing, and the growing foreign competition leads to a 
contraction of the formal sector, the employment in the growing self-employed 
sector may increase, to lead to a non-increasing informal sector wage. Similar 
result may follow from the fact that a growing foreign competition leads the formal 
sector to encroach upon the resources through various means, thereby 
dispossessing the poorer section of the population and driving them into the self-
employed sector. In either of the cases, the model highlights the role of the self-
employed sector in influencing the fate of the informal sector wage. 
Chapter 3 examines the economy of the self-employed sector and finds 
out the general economic features of the production system of this sector. This 
chapter studies numerous self-employed occupations seen in India, provides a 
system view of the production processes that the self-employed sector 
undertakes, analyzes the characteristics of the production relations in this sector 
and finds out the determinant(s) of the availability of the inputs of production and 
of the value of the inputs. The strength of the Kinship Association a self-
employed person belongs to plays crucial role in determining the value of the 
inputs. This chapter argues that since the tools of the conventional production 
theory falls short in accommodating the complexity and subjectivity of the self-
employed sector, different tools need to be used and if required, invented or 
borrowed from other social sciences. 
One of the directions that this research will head to in future is studying 
various types of formal-informal interactions in the Indian subcontinent. There is 
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much more to learn about the informal sector and its interactions with the formal 
sector, as indicated by the review of the existing literature presented in chapter 1. 
The self-employed sector often sells goods and services to the households and 
the formal enterprises at a price that is below the market rate. A future study will 
examine whether this works as a subsidy to the formal sector growth. This will 
also help us understand whether informal sector in pro-cyclical in nature. 
The reason behind the possible pro-cyclicality needs to be studied as well. 
Specifically, unlike the prediction of the Dual economy model proposed by Arthur 
Lewis in 1954, workers come out not only from the traditional agricultural sector 
but from the modern formal sector as well. The question needs to be answered is 
that, is such displacement inherent to the structure of capitalist development? If 
so, how do we re-define development and think about alternative path towards it. 
One of the future researches will delve into finding an answer to this question. 
Another future direction will be towards a historical exploration of the origin 
of the formal sector. This will be done on the premise of the precedence of the 
informal economic activities in the Indian subcontinent, as documented by many 
historians. This research will help us counter the methodological bias of thinking 
about capitalist businessmen first and as the only type of entrepreneurs. By 
countering the legalist framework of understanding the informal sector (that it is 
the state regulations that create informal sector), It will also allow us to better 
understand the self-employed sector, much of which is extra-legal to the core. 
This dissertation took the first step towards a better understanding of the 
economy of the self-employed sector, and of the role of this sector with respect to 
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the other sectors in livelihood generation. There is a lot more research that needs 
to be done, in order to perceive the route for development for the vast majority of 
people that reside in this sector. Therefore, this dissertation works as an entry 
point for a long series of effective and insightful studies. 
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APPENDIX C: Data and Definitions 















Source: NCEUS, 2007. The numbers are in millions. 
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Source: Annual Statistical Reports of the Ministry of Agriculture, Government of 
India, various years. The numbers are in billions of 2005 rupees 
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Informal Subcontracted Sector 




The sector containing registered firms, 
which pay taxes to the government, 
employs workers at regular wages and 
produces manufacturing import-
competing goods; the workers are 
eligible for benefits and protection from 
the labor law. 
The sector consisting of workers who 
work either for the registered or 
unregistered enterprises as casual 
and/or temporary wage-workers, or as 
unregistered self-employed workers 
producing petty consumer goods and 
services. 
The sector containing firms that are 
either registered or unregistered 
employ casual and/or temporary 
workers and produce intermediate 
goods for the formal sector; the 
workers are not eligible for anything 
beyond hourly/daily wages. 
The sector consisting of people who 
are self-employed, may or may not 
employ casual and/or temporary wage-
workers and use social capital and 
labor (family or wage labor) to produce 
petty consumer goods and services. 
The association of people belonging to 
same family, caste, village, religion or 
language group, which influences the 
terms of input supply among the self-
employed population. 




inputs among the self-employed people 
belonging to the same kinship network 
or association. 
The support of people belonging to the 
same kinship network or association in 
acquiring the access to inputs or 
determining the terms of accessing the 
inputs. 
The services rendered to people 
belonging to the same kinship network 
or association in return to the 
availability of inputs; the services may 
or may not include money (Marshall 
Sahlins1972). 
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